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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Bayesian Analysis of Banking Policy and Regulation
By
Padma Ranjini Sharma
Doctor of Philosophy in Economics
University of California, Irvine, 2019
Associate Professor Ivan Jeliazkov, Co-Chair
Professor Gary Richardson, Co-Chair
This dissertation contains essays that study questions related to banking policy and regula-
tion by developing original Bayesian econometric methods that address unobserved hetero-
geneity. The models developed here provide a framework for the assessment of regulatory
decisions, analysis of resolution policy in a causal framework as well as an evaluation of the
nature of heterogeneity of household financial expectations.
In the first chapter, I study the resolution of failed financial institutions by regulators in the
U.S. over the period 1984-1992, which was characterized by concurrent crises in the banking
and Savings and Loans (S & L) industries. Economic theory indicates that regulators best
serve the public interest when they act to discourage moral hazard and preserve channels of
financial intermediation. I determine whether regulators in the two industries conformed to
norms of optimal resolution by developing a Bayesian latent class algorithm to uncover their
decision rules. The results show that whereas the banking regulator’s actions were consistent
with optimal resolution norms recommended by theory, the S & L regulator deviated from
such norms.
The second chapter examines the moral hazard effects of lax regulatory and resolution stan-
dards on thrift institutions during the Savings and Loans crisis. I make use of the natural
xiii
policy experiment arising from the closure of the Federal Savings and Loans Insurance Cor-
poration (FSLIC) and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) in 1989 and the ensuing
regime of stringent regulation of thrift institutions. The paper develops a Bayesian method
for causal inference by incorporating the difference-in-difference strategy into the potential
outcome framework. I find that thrifts facing a high probability of failure increase their
composition of safe assets and reduce the share of high-risk loans on their balance sheet
relative to thrifts at a low probability of failure following the policy change. These results
provide evidence of moral hazard in the thrift industry prior to the introduction of enhanced
regulation and oversight in 1989.
The third chapter examines the nature of heterogeneity in consumer expectations by utilizing
random coefficient models, which are proven to be effective tools to address unobserved
heterogeneity in panel data settings. The estimation method utilized in this study extends
the method developed by Chen & Dunson (2003) for the selection of random effects in linear
models to a model with ordered categorical outcomes. The application of this algorithm on
responses pertaining to credit access and financial position from the Survey of Consumer
Expectations provides evidence in favor of a random intercept. However, the findings do not
support the presence of other random coefficients. This shows that unobserved heterogeneity
exists in the expectation-formation mechanism but does not manifest in the responses to
changes in demographic and economic characteristics of households.
xiv
Chapter 1
Assessing Regulatory Responses to
Troubled Banks
Banks are subject to specialized regulation and policies from their inception through day-
to-day operations even until their contingent closure. Whereas typical business failures are
administered by bankruptcy laws, failed banks are assessed by regulatory agencies that decide
on the appropriate manner in which they are to be dispensed or “resolved”. The resolution of
a bank failure entails one among the following actions - the provision of financial assistance
to the bank to enable its continued operations as a going concern, the sale of the failed bank
to a healthier institution or the liquidation of the bank.
The implications of bank resolution decisions extend beyond the direct costs borne by reg-
ulatory agencies. The provision of financial assistance or bailouts entails the direct use of
taxpayer funds if such agencies are funded by the treasury or via implicit government guaran-
tees provided to overcome funding shortfalls. The moral hazard effects of bailouts that result
in increased risk-taking among recipient banks (Dam & Koetter, 2012; Duchin & Sosyura,
2014) and their competitors (Gropp et al., 2010) have been identified in empirical studies.
1
Ashcraft (2005) identified that resolution methods that entailed a greater disruption of bank-
ing relationships were associated with a greater decline in output. In the U.S., the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) is the regulatory agency charged with resolving failed
banks. The Orderly Liquidation Authority established under the Dodd-Frank Wall Street
Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 (DFA) expanded the authority of the FDIC
beyond banks to include the resolution of any systemically important financial institution.
In the light of the far-reaching effects of resolution decisions, has the FDIC behaved opti-
mally? Does the FDIC’s performance in resolving previous failures support its augmented
role in any future crises? This paper answers these questions empirically by developing an
econometric innovation.
In this paper, I develop a Bayesian latent class model to uncover the FDIC’s decision rules
and provide an assessment of the regulator’s resolution strategies by comparing estimated
rules with optimal decision rules from theoretical studies. Theoretical models provide optimal
rules of bank resolution by considering the effect of regulatory decisions on bank incentives
(Cordella & Yeyati, 2003; Acharya & Yorulmazer, 2007; DeYoung et al., 2013; Bianchi, 2016).
I perform an additional dimension of assessment by comparing the FDIC’s decisions with
those of the now defunct Federal Savings and Loans Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), which
was the insurer and resolution authority of Savings and Loans institutions (S & L) 1, to
determine the role of institutional features in making optimal decisions.
I consider the resolution of all bank failures in the U.S. during the period 1985-1992, which
encompasses the banking crisis of the 1980’s that occurred concurrently with the S & L crisis.
The U.S. experienced more bank failures during this period relative to any other equivalent
period since the Great Depression. The large number of bank resolutions undertaken during
the crisis permits a detailed assessment of the FDIC. The contemporaneous crisis in the
1“ A financial institution that ordinarily possesses the same depository, credit, financial intermediary, and
account transactional functions as a bank, but that is chiefly organized and primarily operates to promote
savings and home mortgage lending rather than commercial lending. Also known as a savings bank, a savings
association, a savings and loan association, or an S&L.”FDIC (1998a)
2
S & L industry enables the comparison of the FDIC’s responses with those of the FSLIC
to widespread failures in their respective industries. Moreover, theoretical models of bank
resolution primarily address the decision of regulators to provide bailouts to distressed banks,
an outcome that bears resemblance to the provision of financial assistance by the FDIC to
failed banks by way of Open Bank Assistance. During the period of this study, the FDIC
retained the authority to provide assistance to failed banks, an option that was restricted
since 1992, subsequent to the passage of FDICIA(1991).
An impediment to the assessment of the FDIC’s decision rules arises from the fact that
even though the ultimate resolution method that was implemented on each failed bank is
publicly available, data pertaining to the rationale behind each resolution decision have not
been retained. Theoretical models derive alternative decision rules that are optimal under
distinct macroeconomic and banking industry conditions but the use of such distinct decision
regimes by the FDIC cannot be directly ascertained in the absence of detailed data. In this
paper, I overcome this issue by developing a Bayesian estimation algorithm for a latent class
model with ordinal outcomes to uncover the FDIC’s system of decision rules using publicly
available data. This model serves as a classification algorithm that assigns banks into distinct
classes on which heterogeneous decision rules were applied by the FDIC, by conditioning on
observable economic and industry characteristics. The estimation algorithm addresses the
uncertainty in class assignment by incorporating a probability of class membership into the
model instead of performing a deterministic classification of banks.
The main contribution of this paper is the finding that the FDIC’s decision rules were
consistent with the optimal decision rule in Cordella & Yeyati (2003) that countervails moral
hazard incentives for excessive risk-taking in the presence of bailouts. The optimal resolution
policy identified by the authors requires ex-ante commitments to bailouts when banks fail in
a climate of macroeconomic distress. The bank failures in this period occurred against the
backdrop of regional crises, salient among which were the recession following the collapse of
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energy prices in Texas, Louisiana and Oklahoma, the agricultural recession in Kansas, Iowa
and Nebraska and the real-estate downturns in California, the Southwest and the Northeast
(FDIC, 1997a). Branching restrictions2 during the period of study combined with regional
recessions to create conditions in which bank failures occurred amid high and low regional
distress contemporaneously. I make use of this variation to identify heterogeneity in the
FDIC’s decision rules based on regional economic conditions.
I find that banks that failed amid high economic distress faced an average probability of
20% of receiving financial assistance compared to banks that failed amid low distress at
3%. Conversely, banks that failed in regions of low economic distress were twice as likely
to be liquidated as banks that failed in regions of high distress with average probabilities
of 8% and 3% respectively. Covariate effects show that stronger balance sheets in the form
of lower ratios of non-performing loans and higher provisions to assets were associated with
a higher probability of receiving financial assistance among banks that failed in regions of
high distress. This finding reveals the FDIC’s resolution strategy of targeting assistance to
banks that were more likely to have failed due to the impact of economic shocks rather than
due to their own inferior portfolio choices.
The responses of the FSLIC differ from those of the FDIC in several important ways. First,
the FSLIC provided assistance to 69% of failed S & L institutions compared to the FDIC,
which assisted 8.5% of the failed banks. Second, the FSLIC did not distinguish across insti-
tutions that failed in high or low economic distress in providing assistance, hence deviating
from the optimal strategy recommended in Cordella & Yeyati (2003) to control moral hazard
incentives. Cole et al. (1995), which identifies moral hazard as an important cause of the S &
L crisis, confirms this finding. Finally, the covariate effects on balance sheet characteristics
pertaining to asset quality are not statistically important in the FSLIC’s decision rules in
2Branching restrictions were eliminated nationwide in 1994 Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act. State-level deregulation occurred prior to this period, thus providing variation in the extent
of deregulation within the industry (Kroszner & Strahan, 1999)
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determining the resolution method to be applied on each institution. Whereas the FSLIC
closed down in 1989 following bankruptcy at a cost of $132 billion (Curry & Shibut, 2000)
to the taxpayer, the FDIC withstood the banking crisis and even took over the oversight of
failed S & L institutions under the auspices of the newly formed Resolutions Trust Corpo-
ration (RTC). In the light of the vastly different trajectories of the two regulatory agencies,
this study sheds light on crucial differences in their operations.
A line of theoretical literature addresses the regulator’s optimal decision rule in pursuing
stability in the financial system in face of widespread bank failure. The “too-many-to-fail”
hypothesis developed by Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007) concluded that when a large number
of banks fail simultaneously and their liquidation entails the acquisition of banking assets
by inefficient users, it is ex-post optimal for the regulator to bail out failed banks. Brown &
Dinc¸ (2011) find empirical support for this theory in a cross-country study of large banks in
emerging markets. This paper contributes to the literature by examining the hypothesis in
a bank-level study in the U.S. The results from a specification based on this hypothesis are
consistent with the theory and show an increased average probability of receiving assistance
among banks that fail amid banking and regional economic distress relative to bank failures
that are not accompanied by such distress. Moreover, the inclusion of indicators of banking
distress result in a greater separation across the average probability of receiving assistance
for the two latent classes when compared to the specification that only considers economic
distress. The FSLIC’s decision rules are not consistent with this theory as the average
probability of receiving assistance is not statistically different across the two classes.
This paper addresses the influence of political economy factors on bank resolution decisions,
which has been discussed in the theoretical literature by DeYoung et al. (2013). This study
shows that classes defined by Congressional voting patterns on bills pertaining to banking
regulation reveal higher probabilities of assistance to banks and S & L’s in regions that have
the benefit of political support. This is the only specification in which differences in mean
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resolution probabilities across classes of S & L’s are seen to be statistically important. These
findings highlight the impact of attempted political influence on the decisions of the FSLIC
as they came to be widely recognized following the “Keating Five” scandal.
This paper provides a methodological contribution by developing an efficient Bayesian algo-
rithm to estimate latent class models with ordinal outcomes. Greene & Hensher (2010) have
developed a classical likelihood-based method for estimating such models. The Bayesian
estimation method developed here provides a coherent framework for performing inference
on all estimated quantities of interest, including marginal effects and the probability of class
membership without having to rely on asymptotic approximations. In simulation exercises,
I establish that the MCMC algorithm developed in this paper explores the full parame-
ter space and therefore overcomes local identifiability issues arising from flatness in certain
regions of the likelihood surface. The Bayesian estimation approach also permits model
comparison using the Bayes Factor, which is more flexible than equivalent classical tests as
this framework allows comparison across models that are not necessarily nested within one
another.
Bennett & Unal (2014) and Balla et al. (2015) are previous bank-level studies that evalu-
ate the FDIC’s bank resolution during the period studied in this paper. The objective of
both studies involved assessing the losses accruing to the FDIC from alternative resolution
methods rather than the estimation of the regulator’s decision rule for bank regulation. Ben-
nett & Unal (2014) study the decision between arranging a purchase of a failed bank and
its liquidation as the first equation in their joint model of resolution type and losses. This
paper expands on this decision model by including the provision of assistance as a resolu-
tion method to the two methods that result in receiverships to the insuring agency in an
ordinal model. I extend the estimation of a single decision rule and address the unobserved
heterogeneity in resolution rules by developing a latent class model.
The article is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a background to the role of the
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FDIC as a receiver of failed banks, the resolution methods at its disposal during the period
of study as well as details of legislations pertaining to bank resolution. Section 3.3 develops
the empirical specification by building from the random utility framework for latent class
model and establishing the relationship between a possible hierarchical decision structure
of the FDIC and the econometric model. This section also includes an efficient MCMC
sampling algorithm to estimate latent class models for ordinal outcomes. Section 3.4 details
the various datasets used in this study, their source and a set of descriptive statistics. Section
1.4 provides the results of the model, Section 2.6 contains results of an extensive model
comparison exercise that tests alternative specifications of the model. Section 1.6 studies
the resolution of S & L failures by the FSLIC and compares the resulting strategies with those
of the FDIC. Section 1.7 considers results under aggregation by Bank Holding Company and
adjusts for Insured Deposit Transactions. Section 1.8 provides the results of prior sensitivity
exercises and Section 1.9 provides concluding remarks.
1.1 Background
This study considers bank failures during 1984-1992, a period marked by over 1300 bank
failures, the largest number of bank failures in US history over an equivalent period since the
Great Depression. Several regions of the US faced economic downturns during this period
due to distress in specific sectors such as energy, real-estate and agriculture. The high interest
and inflation rates that followed the oil shocks of the 1970’s and the deregulation of interest
rates exposed banks to significant interest rate risk during this period. The surge in the cost
of funding and the increased competition from thrifts and foreign banks, contributed toward
deterioration in bank fundamentals and eventual failure. (Hanc, 1998).
The FDIC played a crucial role during the large-scale bank failures of this period since, apart
from its primary role as a deposit insurer, it is also the receiver of banks that are closed by
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their chartering agencies. The resolution mechanisms at the disposal of the FDIC evolved
since its inception in 1933 up until the present through various legislative measures. During
the period of study, 1984-1992, once a bank failed and entered the resolution process, the
FDIC could apply one of the three possible actions:
• Type I: Open Bank Assistance (OBA) - This category comprises of assistance transac-
tions (A/A) to acquirers toward the purchase of a failing bank as a whole institution,
assistance to restore a failing bank to solvency (OBA) and reprivatization (REP). The
bank charter survives and therefore does not result in the severing of banking relation-
ships when resolved under this category. There are no cases of reprivatization in the
data sample considered in this study and ‘Open Bank Assistance (OBA)’ is used to
denote the remaining two types of transactions.
• Type II: Purchase and Assumption (P & A) - This resolution method involves the
transfer of insured deposits as well as some other assets and liabilities to an acquiring
institution. The banking charter of the failing institution is terminated. This resolution
category includes sub-categories of acquisition methods that differ from each other in
the components of the failed bank being acquired. In the following discussion Purchase
and Assumption (P & A) refers to all sub-categories of Type II resolution.
• Type III: Deposit Payout (PO) - This action involves paying out the insured depositors
and liquidating the institution.
1.1.1 Regulatory Landscape
The legislation governing bank resolution has undergone changes over the period from 1980-
1992. The most significant changes affected the circumstances under which the FDIC was
permitted to provide open bank assistance. The FDIC was first authorized to provide as-
sistance to failed banks in 1950 under the Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Under this law,
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the FDIC was limited to providing assistance to failed banks if the institution’s continued
existence was deemed to be essential to the community in which it operated. The FDIC
developed a cost test in 1951 to identify whether payouts or assumption transactions would
result in the lower cost following questioning of its resolution policies by U.S. Senators during
confirmation hearings of appointed members.
The Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 dropped the essentiality test and
permitted the FDIC to provide Open Bank Assistance conditional on this resolution method
being less expensive than a deposit payoff. The Act formalized the cost test that had been
previously implemented by the FDIC to ensure that an assumption transaction did not cost
the FDIC more than a liquidation (FDIC, 1984).
The Competitive Equality Banking Act (CEBA) of 1987 authorized the FDIC to create
bridge banks to resolve failed banks (FDIC, 1998a). A bridge bank is a temporary full-
service controlled by the FDIC, which permitted the deposit insurer to act as an acquiring
institution in an assumptions transaction. These temporary institutions were allowed to
operate for two years with a one-year extension and could subsequently be resolved through
a purchase and assumption, a merger or a stock sale. The Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 amended the CEBA to provide three
one-year extensions.
In 1991, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) mandated
the least cost test, which required the FDIC to undertake the resolution method that im-
posed the lowest cost to the FDIC. The Resolution Trust Corporation Completion Act of
1993 prohibited the FDIC from using its funds to provide assistance to failing institutions,
particularly if such assistance resulted in benefits to the troubled institution’s shareholders
(Walter, 2004). Consequently, the FDIC has not provided Open Bank Assistance since 1993.
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1.1.2 Open Bank Assistance
The FDIC retained the authority to decide on the provision of Open Bank Assistance during
the period under study 1984-1992. These transactions were completed upon agreement
from shareholders and subordinated debt-holders (Bovenzi & Muldoon, 1990). The types
of transactions covered under OBA are listed in Subsection A.1. OBA transactions were
historically provided to large banks and the largest bank failure handled by the FDIC until
then, Continental Illinois in 1984, was resolved with FDIC assistance that resulted in the
term “too-big-to-fail”3. Isaac (2010) qualified this decision as being “too-big-to-liquidate” as
Continental Illinois was a money-center bank with an estimated $6 billion of deposits from
around 2300 small banks. In other cases, such as with First City Bancorporation of Texas
in 1987, the constraints imposed by the bank holding company structure resulted in a Type
I resolution being optimal to the FDIC (Bovenzi & Muldoon, 1990). The impending failure
of the lead bank First City National Bank, Houston entailed that the FDIC would have to
risk financial instability in the case of liquidation or bear large losses in a P & A transaction
as the holding company structure did not allow for loss-sharing with the subsidiary banks.
Bank size did not solely determine the FDIC’s decision to provide assistance to failed banks.
The presence of large contingent liabilities and potential for claims arising from fraud and
negligence of bank management preclude the possibility of obtaining assistance or the ar-
rangement for a merger. The FDIC decided on liquidating and paying out depositors of Penn
Square in in 1982, which had been originating and servicing loans that financed a speculative
oil boom in Oklahoma to several larger banks. The risks of contagion were countered by the
likely claims that could arise from purchasers of the bad loans against the FDIC if the bank
had been permitted to continue to operate or if had been merged with another institution
(Isaac, 2010). In the sample period considered in this study, 90% of banks that received as-
sistance had assets of less than $500 million six months prior to their failure. Furthermore,
3(source: https://www.federalreservehistory.org/essays/failure_of_continental_illinois)
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a policy statement by the FDIC in 1986 stated that proposals for Open Bank Assistance
had to provide for capital infusion from sources other than the FDIC, indicating that the
institution was required to demonstrate sufficient continuation value to investors if it was
provided with the opportunity to retain its charter. The decision to provide assistance was
therefore determined by a combination of bank size, contagion risks as well as the quality of
bank assets and management.
1.1.3 Ordering of Outcomes
Ashcraft (2005) points out that each of the three resolution categories entail a progressively
more severe breakdown of relationships between the bank and its customers. The provision
of assistance allows a bank to continue functioning in its present form. An assumptions
transaction results in certain loan and deposit relationships continuing within the acquiring
bank’s books. A liquidation and deposit payout results in the termination of all banking
relationships.
While the three resolution methods involve a natural progression of severity of impact on
banking relationships, the FDIC viewed the decision to adopt each resolution method from
the perspective of the cost to the deposit insurance fund and broader implications for financial
stability.
The decision process of the FDIC could therefore be summarized as follows:
• The cost test would determine whether the FDIC would liquidate the bank and payout
insured depositors or choose a Type I or Type II resolution.
• Banks whose failure would result in financial instability with no evidence of fraud or
smaller banks that retained sufficient value to demonstrate their ability to continue
functioning as a going concern if provided with assistance were resolved under a Type
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I transaction.
• Banks with sufficient franchise value to elicit bids from acquirers but not significant
enough to be offered OBA were resolved under Type II methods.
• A Deposit Payout was pursued as a last resort if the FDIC received no other bids
that were less costly than this resolution method (FDIC, 1998a). Banks that failed
to invite any bids that were less expensive than liquidation after paying off depositors
were subject to a Type III resolution.4
This ranking of banks resulting from the legislative constraints on the FDIC provides the
motivation to model bank resolution type as an ordinal outcome in the following section.
This specification will subsequently be tested empirically by comparing models in which the
FDIC’s decision is considered to be an ordinal outcome with one in which the decision is
treated as multinomial.
1.2 Empirical Specification
In this section, I discuss the choice of the latent class model for ordinal outcomes to model
the FDIC’s decisions on resolving failed banks and develop an efficient Bayesian method to
estimate this model.
4“ The FDIC used deposit payoffs in the worst situations, those where no one really wanted the failed
bank franchise in a P & A transaction.” Source: Managing the Crisis: The FDIC and RTC Experience,
Volume 1, pp. 100-101.
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1.2.1 Modeling the FDIC’s Decisions Using A Latent Class Model
for Ordinal Outcomes
Heckman & Singer (1984) presented duration models with latent classes as a nonparametric
alternative to random coefficients models to model unobserved heterogeneity. Latent class
models have since been developed for different outcome types and applied in a wide range of
fields including transportation (Greene & Hensher, 2003), healthcare (Deb & Trivedi, 2002)
and marketing (Swait, 1994). The use of latent class models is suitable in studies where
1) there is a well-founded theoretical motivation to expect heterogeneity in the relationship
between covariates and the response, 2) the researcher expects the presence of a finite number
of heterogeneous classes in the data and 3) while the true class affiliations of observations is
known to the decision-maker and unobserved by the researcher, the probability of belonging
to a class can be estimated using observable covariates.
The study of FDIC’s resolution of bank failures meets each of these requirements and lends
itself to estimation using this method. Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007) provide an important
theoretical rationale for the hypothesis of heterogeneity in FDIC’s treatment of bank failures.
The authors find that the ex-post optimal response of the regulator when a large number of
banks fail is different from the optimal response to a few failures.This result motivates the
specification of two latent classes in the ordinal outcome model. The equilibrium outcome in
their two-bank model involves the purchase of the failed bank by the healthy bank when only
one bank fails and a time-inconsistent ex-post strategy of bailout of both banks when they
both fail. As a result, banks find it optimal to herd or choose portfolios of loans in similar
industries and are, in turn, likely to fail simultaneously. In interpreting the conclusions
of their study within the context of the banking crisis of the 1980’s, I consider failures
of banks due to idiosyncratic and systemic factors as the two different outcomes requiring
distinct decision-rules. Identifying the occurrence of “too many” failures is challenging as
this threshold varies by the size of the banking sector in each market across the country. It
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is, however, plausible that banks that fail concurrently with distress in the local economy
in which they operate are more likely to be exposed to market or systemic risk and for a
correlation to exist among the assets of all such banks. Banks that fail when there is no
significant regional economic distress are likely to have failed due to problems in their own
portfolio or practices and therefore likely to fail when there are other bank failures in the
same market. The FDIC would have identified the class into which each failed bank belonged
at the time of their failure based on a range of bank-specific and economic indicators and
undertaken the optimal strategy relevant to that class. As the econometrician to whom true
classes are unobservable, I estimate the probability of each bank belonging to one of two
classes using a latent class model with local economic outcomes as covariates that predict
class membership.
Random Utility Framework
The latent classes in the context of bank resolutions represent two different decision protocols
(Gopinath, 1997) of the FDIC in arriving at the type of resolution method. The FDIC first
identifies the decision protocol (the latent class) si to be applied to a bank i and then decides
on the type of resolution method yi conditional on the decision protocol. The random utility
representation of this model is based on the framework developed by Marschak (1974) and
involves representing the choice of the decision rule and the ultimate decision on resolution
type conditional on the decision rule using this framework.
The choice among the two decision protocols is modeled as a binary discrete choice problem
with outcome s, a set of covariates W and parameters α. It is important to note that s
is unobserved and is therefore a discrete latent variable. The random utility representation
is then applied to this discrete choice problem with the introduction of an additional error
term νi and the definition of the latent variable li, the difference in utilities or value to the
FDIC from deciding on bank i using decision protocols 1 and 2 (Jeliazkov & Rahman, 2012)
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li = W
′
iα + νi. (1.1)
The relationship between the discrete variable si and the continuous variable li can be
expressed in the following threshold crossing framework
si =

1 if li ≤ 0
2 otherwise
.
Subsequent to the determination of the decision protocol to be used, consider the FDIC’s
utility function zi,si from resolving bank i under latent class si, where,
zi,si = X
′
iβsi + i,si , s = 1, 2. (1.2)
zi,si is the utility to the FDIC of keeping bank i open under decision protocol si. This utility
can be considered to represent the overall assessment of the bank’s social value by the FDIC
based on its financial health and other factors such as size. X ′iβsi represents the part of
utility that involves criteria that the researcher can observe and i,si represents the part of
the utility that the researcher cannot observe Train (2009). Let yi denote the resolution
type assigned to bank i, which is observed in the data. When banks show the potential
to recover to solvency with the provision of financial support or are systemically important
enough that the termination of their charter is to be prevented, they are provided with Open
Bank Assistance (Type I resolution). When banks are unlikely to recover to financial health
but retain sufficient franchise value so that their assets draw bids from surviving banks,
they are resolved with a Purchase and Assumptions transaction (Type II resolution). Banks
that show no prospect of recovery and whose assets do not invite viable bids from other
banks are liquidated under a Deposit Payout (Type III resolution). The FDIC selects each
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of these options depending on whether the value it attributes to the bank crosses a threshold
γk,s. This relationship between the observed outcome yi and the latent utility zi,si can be
represented as,
yi =

3 if −∞ < zi,si ≤ γ1,si
2 if γ1,si < zi,si ≤ γ2,si
1 if γ2,si < zi,si ≤ ∞
.
Likelihood Function
The likelihood contribution Pij of bank i receiving resolution treatment j is the sum of the
likelihood contribution based on each latent class weighted by the probability of belonging
to each of the two latent classes,
Pij =
2∑
s=1
Pij|sQis. (1.3)
Pij|s is the probability of yi taking a particular value j conditional on belonging to class s.
Qis is the probability of observation i belonging to class s. On specifying a νi ∼ N (0, 1), we
obtain the following binary probit representation of the class membership model.
Qis = Φ(W
′
iα)
s′
[1− Φ(W ′iα)]1−s
′
, s′ = s− 1, s = 1, 2. (1.4)
In estimating the ordinal outcome model conditional on class membership, I use the identi-
fication scheme in which the cut-points γ1,1 and γ1,2 are restricted to 0 and the penultimate
cut-points in both classes, γ2,1 and γ2,2 are restricted to 1 (Jeliazkov & Rahman, 2012). This
identification restriction eliminates the need for estimating cut-points and allows the scale
parameter to be estimated as a free parameter. On specifying a N (0, σ2) distribution for
the unobserved component i, the probability of yi taking a particular value j conditional
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on class s is,
Pij|s = Φ(
γj,s − x′iβs
σs
)− Φ(γj−1,s − x
′
iβs
σs
) s = 1, 2. (1.5)
The likelihood function is obtained as,
L =
n∏
i=1
Pij,
where Pij is defined in 1.3 and its components in equations 1.4 and 1.5.
1.2.2 Augmented Posterior
On augmenting the likelihood with the latent variables z and s defined above using the
method of Albert & Chib (1993), the augmented posterior for the parameters and latent
variables θ = {β1, β2, σ21, σ22, α, z, s} in this model with two classes can be represented as
follows,
f(θ|y) ∝
n∏
i=1
2∑
s=1
{1(si = s)fyi|zi,sfzi,s|βsσsQis}f(β1, σ21)f(β2, σ22)f(α).
f(yi|zis) is the indicator function 1(γyi−1,s < zis ≤ γyi,s). f(zi,s|βs, σs) is the normal density,
fN (z|x′iβs, σs), s = 1, 2.
I assign a multivariate normal prior to βs and an Inverse Gamma prior to σ
2
s for s = 1, 2.
The priors are independent and the joint density is given by,
f(βs, σ
2
s) = fN (βs|β0,s, B0,s)fIG
(
σ2s |
ν
2
,
d
2
)
.
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The prior for α is a multivariate normal, so that,
f(α) = fN (α|α0, A0).
1.2.3 MCMC Algorithm
The MCMC algorithm to estimate this model involves augmentation using two latent vari-
ables, the discrete class indicator, si and the continuous variable zi,si that underlies the
ordinal outcome yi. The standard approach to constructing the MCMC algorithm for this
model involves drawing from full conditionals for each of the parameters and the two latent
variables within a Gibbs sampler. The steps of the full Gibbs sampler are detailed in the
Appendix A.2. The algorithm developed in this section improves upon the standard method
by constructing a Collapsed Gibbs sampler (Liu, 1994) in which the discrete latent variable
s has been marginalized out of the conditional for α. This novel approach to marginaliza-
tion significantly improves mixing and reduces autocorrelations among successive MCMC
draws. The improvement afforded by this method is established in Figures A.1 and A.2 in
the Appendix, which provide the autocorrelation plots of α under a full Gibbs sampler and
the proposed collapsed Gibbs sampler respectively. In the following discussion, S is the full
vector of class membership indicators si for the n observations, where each si can take values
s = 1, 2.
Algorithm: Collapsed Gibbs Sampler
1. Sample βs from the distribution βs|z, S, σ2s for s = 1, 2.
2. Sample σ2s from σ
2
s |βs, z, S for s = 1, 2.
3. Sample α from α|β, σ2, y for where σ2 = {σ21, σ22} and β = {β1, β2}.
4. Sample s′i from s
′
i|α, β, σ2, y for i = 1, 2, ...., n.
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5. Sample zi,si from zi,si |β, σ2, y, S for i = 1, 2, ...., n.
Sampling coefficients of the Ordinal Model: β
The coefficients of the ordinal model βs, are sampled for the two latent classes, i.e., for
s = 1, 2 from their respective conditional posterior distributions, βs ∼ N
(
βˆs, Bˆs
)
, where
Bˆs =
(
B−10,s + X
′
sXs/σ
2
s
)−1
and βˆs = Bˆs
(
B−10,sβ0,s + X
′
szs/σ
2
s
)
. The matrices Xs and zs are
rows of X and z that correspond to class s and can be obtained using Xs =
{
Xi : si = s
}
and zs =
{
zi : si = s
}
. This computation is efficient as it involves working with matrices of
reduced dimensions n1 and n2, without having to preserve the full length n of the matrices
X and z.
Sampling the variance of the Ordinal Model: σ2
The variances are sampled using the conditionals σ2s |z, S, β ∼ IG(νˆs, dˆs) for s = 1,2, where
νˆ = (ν+ns)/2 and dˆ =
(
d+ (zs−Xsβs)′(zs−Xsβs)
)
/2. Xs and zs are the matrices retained
from the previous step. ns is the number of observations in class s and is updated in every
MCMC iteration.
Sampling coefficients of the Class Membership Model: α
The coefficients of the class membership model α are sampled from α|β, σ2, y marginally of S
by using a Metropolis Hastings step with tailored proposal α† ∼ q(α|β, σ2, y). The proposed
draw α† from this proposal is accepted with probability,
ΥMH(α, α
†) = min
{
1,
f(α†|β, σ2, y)q(α|β, σ2, y)
f(α|β, σ2, y)q(α†|β, σ2, y)
}
,
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where q(α|β, σ2, y) = fT (αˆ, V, ν), αˆ = arg max f(y|α, β, σ2)f(α), V is the inverse of the
negative Hessian of ln
{
f(y|α, β, σ2)f(α)} evaluated at αˆ and ν is the degree of freedom
parameter.
The expression f(α|β, σ2, y) is proportional to the product of f(y|α, β, σ2) and f(α) where,
f(y|α, β, σ2) =
n∏
i=1
(1− Φ(W ′iα))Pyi|1 + Φ(W ′iα)Pyi|2.
The expressions for Pyi|s, s = 1, 2 are obtained by replacing the indicator j in Equation 1.5
with the outcome yi to obtain,
Pyi|s = Φ(
γyi,s − x′iβs
σs
)− Φ(γyi−1,s − x
′
iβs
σs
), s = 1, 2. (1.6)
This MH step enhances the efficiency of the overall algorithm by circumventing the need for
additional data augmentation through the latent variable li from Equation 1.1.
Sampling the class membership indicator: S
The vector S of class membership indicators si identifies the latent class s = 1, 2 to which
each observation i belongs. These indicators are sampled from a Bernoulli distribution by
introducing the binary variable s′i = si − 1, where s′i|α, β, σ2, y ∼ Bern(Ki) for i = 1,2,....,n
and,
Ki =
Φ(W ′iα)Pyi|2
Φ(W ′iα)Pyi|2 + (1− Φ(W ′iα))Pyi|1
.
The values Pyi|2 and Pyi|2 are retained from the previous step and are computed using 1.6.
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Table 1.1: Credibility intervals based on two parameter specifications
Param. Spec. 1 Param. Spec. 2
True Values Cred. Int. True Values Cred. Int.
Class Membership
α1 -0.3 [-0.42,-0.26] -0.3 [-0.5,-0.22]
α2 1.5 [1.29,1.53] 1.5 [1.14,1.48]
Latent class 1
β11 0.6 [0.57,0.64] 0.6 [0.59,0.67]
β21 -0.7 [-0.69,-0.61] -0.6 [-0.67,-0.57]
β31 -0.6 [-0.62,-0.53] -0.6 [-0.69,-0.6]
β41 0.5 [0.48,0.58] 0.5 [0.48,0.57]
σ21 0.25 [0.2,0.27] 0.25 [0.22,0.29]
Latent class 2
β12 0.1 [0.06,0.17] 0.1 [-0.03,0.08]
β22 0.6 [0.56,0.66] -0.1 [-0.12,-0.04]
β32 0.2 [0.18,0.26] -0.1 [-0.11,-0.02]
β42 0.8 [0.79,0.94] 0.8 [0.79,0.92]
σ22 0.25 [0.21,0.29] 0.25 [0.17,0.24]
Sampling the latent variable: z
The sampling of continuous latent variables zi,si is based on the data augmentation step
from Albert & Chib (1993), resulting in zi,si |β, γ, α, σ2, y ∼ TN(γyi−1,γyi )(x′iβsi , σ2si) for i =
1,2,...n. The second subscript si is added to establish that the sampling scheme augments just
the continuous outcomes associated with the class s to which each observation belongs and
does not require the augmentation based on the counterfactual latent class. This approach
minimizes storage requirements and permits the sampling of the entire vector z in one step.
1.2.4 Simulation Study
The simulation study based on Algorithm 2 was performed on two sets of parameter specifi-
cations, the first of which considered latent classes whose means are distinct from each other
and the other, in which the means overlap. The simulation exercise has been performed on a
sample of 1200 observations under both studies. Table 1.1 provides the 1 standard deviation
credibility intervals in the estimation of parameters under the two specifications. The priors
in this estimation are α ∼ N (0, 3 × I), βs ∼ N (0, I) and σ2s ∼ (4.3, 2.8) for s = 1, 2. The
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credibility intervals under specification 1 contain the true values of all parameters except for
β21, which marginally falls short of the true value. Under specification 2, the true values of
parameters marginally lie beyond credibility intervals for α2, β21, β12 and σ
2
2. The credibility
intervals are also narrower under specification 1 relative to specification 2. These results
show that estimates are more precise when there is a greater separation across latent classes.
The MCMC Algorithm and simulation results for a model that requires the estimation of
cut-points, viz., involving outcomes with more than three categories, has been discussed in
A.3.
1.3 Data
This study considers bank failures between 1984 and 1992 using data from Historical Statis-
tics on Banking maintained by the FDIC. These institutions have been matched with call
reports from the Federal Reserve of Chicago using the certificate number issued by the FDIC.
These reports have been aggregated up by certificate number, which is uniquely assigned to
each head office depository institution. This results in 1385 banks, of which there are 118,
1175 and 92 institutions resolved under resolution types 1, 2 and 3 respectively in the time
period of interest. Information on branching deregulation laws was collated using the table
in Strahan et al. (2003).
Data on quarterly housing starts at the state level have been obtained from IHS Global
Insight. Data on annual unemployment at the state level were obtained from the Iowa
Community Indicators Program of Iowa State University. The quarterly share of employment
across sectors at the county level has been collated from the Bureau of Economic Analysis.
Classification of cities into metro and non-metro status was performed based on the Rural-
Urban continuuum codes from the US Department of Agriculture. HHI was computed based
22
Table 1.2: Descriptive statistics of bank, county and state-level characteristics
OBA P & A Dep. Payoff
Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev
Bank-level characteristics
C&I Loan Ratio 27% 13% 28% 13% 28% 13%
CLD Loan Ratio 6% 8% 5% 8% 4% 8%
Agricultural Loan Ratio 4% 10% 9% 10% 18% 10%
Consumer Loan Ratio 24% 18% 19% 18% 20% 18%
Real Estate Loan Ratio 39% 17% 42% 17% 31% 17%
Loan Loss Reserves Ratio 6% 6% 4% 6% 5% 6%
Nonperforming loans Ratio 6% 6% 8% 6% 8% 6%
Interest Receivable Ratio 1% 1% 1% 1% 2% 1%
Securities Ratio 12% 12% 13% 12% 14% 12%
Core Deposits Ratio 63% 18% 73% 18% 74% 18%
Earnings -3% 6% -3% 6% -4% 6%
Size(Assets mlns.) 212 654 170 890 47 96
County/ state characteristics
Herfindahl Index (HHI) 0.15 0.13 0.26 0.21 0.26 0.20
Unemployment 8.07 1.45 7.17 1.61 6.38 1.38
Housing starts 13.46 7.04 11.17 12.91 15.68 17.50
Metro/Non-metro 0.78 0.41 0.64 0.48 0.49 0.50
Per capita income growth rate 2.60 2.68 4.54 4.99 5.84 6.55
Farm, Agri and Mining 8% 8% 11% 11% 16% 14%
Manufacturing 11% 5% 11% 7% 8% 5%
Construction 6% 1% 5% 2% 5% 2%
Fin Serv and Transport 39% 7% 36% 9% 36% 11%
Government 15% 6% 16% 7% 16% 6%
% Republicans 35% 14% 40% 18% 47% 19%
vote for enhancing reg. agencies powers 83% 14% 80% 21% 83% 18%
vote for restor. civil penalties for fin. inst. 93% 20% 88% 23% 82% 28%
vote for recommitting S & L restruct. bill 97% 2% 98% 3% 98% 3%
vote for CEBA 99% 3% 98% 5% 98% 4%
vote for disclosure of CRA ratings 33% 17% 37% 23% 33% 26%
Count 118 - 1175 - 92 -
on the historical Statistics on Depository Institutions data from the FDIC. Congressional
voting data was obtained from the website of GovTrack 5.
All variables have been normalized prior to estimation in order to preempt any numerical
issues.
5https://www.govtrack.us
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1.4 Results
In this section, I present results from two benchmark models that differ from each other
in the characteristics used to define the latent classes. The first model identifies latent
classes based on regional economic indicators whereas the latter model incorporates data
on Congressional voting patterns to explain the mechanisms through which the FDIC could
have followed alternative decision rules. These results are based on 10000 iterations of the
collapsed Gibbs sampler from Section 1.2.3 collected after a burn-in of 1000 iterations.
1.4.1 Regional Distress and Bank Resolutions
This specification uses regional distress to identify variations in the FDIC’s decision rules
on bank resolutions in response to broader economic conditions within which the failures
occurred. Cordella & Yeyati (2003), in their model of bank bailouts, concluded that an
optimal resolution policy that reduces risk-taking among banks requires ex-ante commit-
ments to bailouts when banks fail in a climate of macroeconomic distress. I utilize the latent
class approach to identify alternative decision rules applied by the FDIC under high and
low regional economic distress and use bank-level characteristics in the ordinal model for the
probability of each resolution category.
The covariates in the class membership model and the model for resolution type together
constitute the types of information that bank examiners are instructed to review per the
OCC’s guidelines (U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2011). Walter (2004) summarizes these
guidelines and lists data from bank financial statements, information on local economic
conditions, the health of industries serviced by the bank, and market indicators of the banks
well-being as important considerations in bank examinations.
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Class Membership
This model postulates that the alternative decision rules adopted by the FDIC were based
on the economic characteristics of regions in which failed banks were located. The class
membership model incorporates state-level unemployment rate and housing starts as well as
county-level per capita income growth and employment share of agriculture as covariates.
These regional economic indicators are based on the year prior to failure. State-level un-
employment and housing starts as well as county-level income growth encompass systemic
fluctuations at the regional level and represent factors considered by bank examiners while
evaluating alternative resolution methods. The share of employment in agriculture at the
county level identifies areas that were more likely to be affected by the agricultural recession
of the mid-80’s detailed in Hanc (1998). The results in table 1 show that the unemployment
rate and number of housing starts are statistically important in determining class member-
ship. Per capita income growth and the share of agricultural employment are of moderate
importance in determining latent classes. The negative sign associated with the coefficient of
unemployment and the positive sign for housing starts and per capita income growth imply
that banks that failed during periods of high unemployment or periods of regional economic
stress belong to latent class 1. As a result latent class 1 will be labeled as the class of failures
under “High Regional Distress (HRD)” and latent class 2, as the class of failures under “Low
Regional Distress (LRD)”.
Resolution Type
The covariates considered in the model for resolution type are primarily drawn from Balla
et al. (2015). The various ratios are based on balance sheet and income statement infor-
mation from quarterly call reports. Each of these ratios are calculated 6 months prior to
the date of failure as this is intended to replicate the duration between the regulators’ final
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examination and decision on the type of resolution procedure to be applied on the failed
bank. This subsection provides an overview of the relative magnitudes and signs of coeffi-
cients in the two latent classes. A more detailed analysis of the impact of each covariate
on the probability of receiving each of the three resolution types is discussed in detail in
Section 1.4.2, which describes covariate effects. Since all continuous explanatory variables
have been standardized, direct comparisons across posterior means of covariates can be made
to draw inferences about relative magnitudes. Positive signs of coefficients are indicative of
an increase in the probability of resolutions involving the closure of a bank charter (Type II
and III resolutions) for a one standard deviation change in the covariate and negative signs
are indicative of an increase in the probability of a Type I resolution.
Overall, the magnitudes of coefficients and covariate effects are larger for banks in HRD com-
pared to those in LRD. This indicates that bank-specific characteristics played an important
role in the type of resolution outcome for banks that failed during a period of regional
economic stress. For banks that failed due to institution-specific factors, the relationship
between resolution type and financial characteristics is tenuous as observed in Table 1.4.
A comparison of the two sets of posterior means reveals that the Real Estate Loan Ratio,
Loan Loss Reserves Ratio and Nonperforming Loans Ratio show the greatest separation
in magnitudes of posterior means across the two latent classes. On account of the risk
posed by real estate bubbles across the country, a higher concentration of real estate loans
would be associated with greater risk of failure and consequently, with a more severe form
of resolution. This relationship is noticed in the coefficient within the HRD class but is
absent in LRD, where the coefficient is negative and of small magnitude. Loan loss reserves,
on account of being negatively associated with bank failure (Balla et al., 2015), are likely
to entail a lower probability of liquidation. This is reflected in the negative coefficient
associated with this variable within HRD but not in the small positive coefficient within
LRD. Nonperforming loans should be unambiguously associated with weak asset quality
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and hence a higher probability of bank closure by the regulators. While the coefficient for
HRD provides evidence of such a relationship, the coefficient within LRD is both weak and
negative.
Balla et al. (2015) found the Interest Receivable Ratio to be highly predictive of both bank
failure and loss subsequent to failure in their study. Bennett & Unal (2014) also found
increasing values of an equivalent variable, Earned Income to be reflective of asset quality as
this variable is indicative of distressed assets that have not yet been written off. This ratio
is seen to be important in the FDIC’s evaluation of bank health as it results in a positive
posterior mean in both latent classes, with a significantly larger effect within HRD. Bank
size measured as the log of assets is found to be negatively associated with the probability of
being subjected to a Type III resolution across both latent classes. The prevailing importance
of bank size after controlling for other aspects of banks’ financial health sheds light on the
possible emphasis on the “too-big-to-fail” doctrine by authorities during the crisis of the
1980’s.
The coefficient of Commercial and Industrial (C&I) loan ratio indicates higher levels of risk
attributed to increases in this ratio by the FDIC (FDIC, 1998a) and consequently, higher
probability of a Type III resolution. Concentrations of these loans (27.5%) are higher than
those of Construction and land development (CLD) loans (4.6%) in the sample period con-
sidered and this is commensurate with the larger impact of this ratio on resolution outcomes
compared to the latter. These ratios help control for balance sheet composition in order
to permit comparisons across measures of asset quality such as Nonperforming Loans Ratio
and Interest Receivable Ratio.
Interstate is an indicator variable that takes the value 1 if interstate banking was legal in
the state in which a bank is located in the year of failure. Interstate banking laws are likely
to affect resolution outcomes as they determine the breadth of demand for assets of failed
banks. In the theoretical model by Acharya & Yorulmazer (2008), the occurrence of a large
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Table 1.3: Posterior estimates for the class membership model.
Class membership model
Post. Mean Post. SD
Intercept 2.070 0.420
State level Unemployment -3.874 0.925
Housing starts 1.076 0.633
Per capita income growth 0.395 0.450
Farm, Agri and Mining 0.781 0.484
number of bank failures reduces the total liquidity among surviving banks and induces the
requirement for regulatory intervention in the form of assistance or provision of liquidity
in order to prevent acquisition of banks by inefficient outsiders. The liquidity provision
facility described in their model is akin to assistance under Type I resolutions. This model
suggests that interstate banking, by expanding the set of available acquiring banks, should
be associated with an increase in the probability of a Type II resolution and an equivalent
decline in the probability of a Type I resolution. The positive sign associated with this
coefficient in both latent classes confirms the Cash-in-market hypothesis.
A higher ratio of securities to assets is an indicator of greater liquidity in the balance sheet
of the bank. A greater proportion of core deposits improves the franchise value of the
bank and makes it more attractive to potential acquirers. These two characteristics, in
addition to the earnings ratio are expected to result in a lower probability of liquidation
under Type III resolutions. I find, however, that the sign of the coefficient is counter to what
we would expect for Securities and Core Deposits Ratios. The covariate effects for these three
variables are not strong and this indicates that on controlling for other balance sheet items
such as Nonperforming Loans and Interest Receivable Ratios, the role of these variables in
determining the resolution type is diminished. The differences across the two latent classes
can be summarized by the estimated probability of each resolution type for the HRD and
LRD failures. The results in Table 1.5 provide the conditional and marginal probabilities of
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Table 1.4: Posterior Estimates for the two latent classes of the ordinal probit model with
FDIC’s resolution category as the outcome
Latent Class 1 (HRD) Latent Class 2 (LRD)
Post. Mean Post. SD Post. Mean Post. SD
Intercept 0.168 0.071 0.617 0.034
C&I Loan Ratio 0.057 0.030 0.008 0.017
CLD Ratio -0.062 0.030 0.023 0.017
Real Estate Loan Ratio 0.162 0.036 -0.011 0.021
Loan Loss Reserves Ratio -0.124 0.029 0.023 0.017
Nonperforming Loans Ratio 0.123 0.028 -0.008 0.018
Interest Receivable Ratio 0.092 0.038 0.048 0.018
Securities Ratio 0.042 0.027 -0.026 0.016
Core Deposits Ratio 0.005 0.030 0.004 0.017
Earnings -0.014 0.028 -0.018 0.017
Size -0.085 0.036 -0.041 0.018
InterState 0.142 0.077 -0.053 0.041
Sigma 0.087 0.015 0.088 0.006
each resolution type. The columns “HRD” and “LRD” provide the probability,
Avg. Prob(Y = j|s) = 1
nG
n∑
i=1
G∑
g=1
P
(g)
ij|s, j = 1, 2, 3, (1.7)
where s = 1 and s = 2 correspond to the results for the class of HRD and LRD failures
respectively and g is the index for the G post burn-in MCMC draws. The values P
(g)
ij|s
are computed for each MCMC iteration using 1.5. The values in the column “Overall”
are similarly obtained by averaging P
(g)
ij from 1.3 over the n observations and G MCMC
iterations.
These results demonstrate that the latent class algorithm results in two distinct classes, with
the average probability of a Type I resolution in the HRD class of 22.7%, about eight times
the equivalent probability in the LRD class of failures. The average probability of a Type
III resolution in the LRD class, at 8.9%, is more than twice the average probability of this
resolution type in the HRD class.
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Table 1.5: Average estimated probability of each resolution type under the latent classes for
failures in High Regional Distress (HRD) and Low Regional Distress (LRD) classes
HRD LRD Overall
Type I 0.227 0.035 0.093
Type II 0.741 0.876 0.832
Type III 0.032 0.089 0.075
Figure 1.1: Covariate effects across High Regional Distress (HRD) and Low Regional Distress
(LRD) latent classes.
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1.4.2 Covariate Effects
Figure 1.1 summarizes the results of the model by providing the covariate effects for the two
latent classes defined by the extent of regional distress. The bar on the left represents the
average change in probability of the resolution type occurring for a one standard deviation
change in the covariate of interest in the latent class comprising of failures in the HRD class.
The bar on the right represents the equivalent quantities for the latent classes comprising of
LRD failures. The credible interval of these effects based on a 1 posterior standard deviation
interval around the mean is represented by the error bars. The six largest covariate effects
from the ordered response model have been reported in this section. The covariate effects of
the remaining variables are provided in Figure A.3 of the Appendix.
The magnitudes of the covariate effects are distinctly larger in the HRD latent class relative
to the LRD failures. The majority of banks in the HRD class are seen to arise from a small
group of states, namely, Texas, Louisiana, Colorado and Massachusetts and are banks that
failed in 1987 and 1988. Banks in the class of LRD failures originate from a wide group
of states and there are approximately an equal number of banks by each year of failure in
this group. The results suggest that the decision protocol of the FDIC involving systemic
failures was applied to banks from a limited set of states and was mainly in use during
1987 and 1988. The stronger covariate effects for banks in this class is also indicative of a
more clearly defined ordering of banks by the FDIC based on their financial characteristics
for this group of banks compared to those whose failures were largely idiosyncratic. These
differences in covariate effects across the latent classes are also indicative of failures that did
ot occur within the context of broader regional distress being evaluated on a case-by-case
basis, which potentially included the assessment of unobservable individual circumstances
by the FDIC in addition to the evaluation of financial statement information.
A unit standard deviation change in Real Estate Ratio and Nonperforming Loans Ratio
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results in a reduced probability of obtaining Open Bank Assistance among HRD failures and
increases the probability of such banks undergoing a Purchase and Assumptions resolution
or even a Deposit Payout under both models. The LRD failures do not experience such a
sharp change in their probability of receiving alternative resolution types and even undergo
a marginally decreased prospect of being liquidated by the use of a Deposit Payout for an
equivalent change in these ratios.
Changes in Interest Receivable Ratio elicits contrasting responses from the FDIC across the
two latent classes for the same magnitude of change in these two covariates. An increase
in Interest Receivable Ratio among HRD failures results in a reduction in the probability
of Open Bank Assistance and a corresponding increase in the probability of Purchase and
Assumptions. Banks that failed due to factors specific to their own institutions were more
likely to have received the most severe form of resolution, a Deposit Payout as the probability
of the other two resolution types decreases for these institutions. A one standard deviation
increase in log of assets among banks that failed in economically distressed regions increases
the probability of an Open Bank Assistance and decreases the probability of the remaining
two resolution types among systemic failures. LRD failures experience a moderate increase
in the probability of Open Bank Assistance and Purchase and Assumptions and a decrease
in the probability of a Deposit Payout.
An increase in Loan Loss Reserves ratio among systemic failures is associated with a higher
probability of receiving Open Bank Assistance in the class of HRD failures. However, an
equivalent increase in this financial statement item among idiosyncratic failures is associ-
ated with an increase in their probability of being liquidated. A possible explanation for
this disparity in response from the FDIC is that among systemic failures, bank regulators
can benchmark the changes in reserve ratios to deterioration in asset quality resulting from
market-wide fluctuations. The FDIC is likely to have considered the greater extent of asym-
metric information inherent in the increase in Loan Loss Reserve Ratio among idiosyncratic
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failures, and viewed the increase in this ratio as a signal of progressively deteriorating asset
quality.
1.4.3 Demand-Side Factors
In addition to considerations of regional economic factors, the state of the banking industry
in the region in which the bank operates is important in determining resolution outcomes.
Shleifer & Vishny (1992, 2011) establish that liquidation values of a firm’s assets are lower
than the values associated with their best use when its industry faces financial distress and
the highest potential bidders do not bid on the assets. Bennett & Unal (2014) developed
an “industry distress” hypothesis based on this theoretical model and found that periods
of banking crises resulted in impediments to liquidations, which in turn led to the FDIC
choosing private sector reorganizations at a higher cost than the potential cost of liquidation.
Acharya & Yorulmazer (2007, 2008) in their theoretical model, concluded that when a large
number of banks fail and their liquidation entails acquisition of banking assets by inefficient
users, it is optimal for the regulator to bail out failed banks. The authors also found that it
is ex-post equivalent to providing liquidity to surviving banks to facilitate their acquisition of
assets of failed banks. This literature points to alternative decision rules for bank resolution
depending on the health of the banking industry. The models predict that the FDIC is likely
to have engaged in Type I and Type II resolutions when the industry was distressed, and
that Type III resolutions would have occurred when the banking industry was sufficiently
healthy to afford the absorption of the liquidated assets.
The predictions from the literature on cash-in-the-market hypothesis are tested by consid-
ering latent classes on the basis of the health of the banking industry. Bank closures within
a county six months prior to failure and the proportion of assets in banks with Texas ra-
tio greater than 100% are considered as indicators of the extent of distress in the banking
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industry.
The Texas Ratio for a bank is defined as,
Texas Ratio =
Non-performing Assets
Tangible Equity + Loan Loss Reserves
and the bank is considered to be distressed when this ratio exceeds a threshold of 1 (Cooke
et al., 2015; Siems et al., 2012). The posterior moments for four different specifications
Table 1.6: Posterior estimates for class membership models that consider indicators for
regional economic distress and distress in the banking industry. Posterior standard deviations
are reported in parentheses.
M1 M2 M3 M4
Intercept 2.07 (0.42) 2.25 (0.46) 2.16 (0.38) 1.98 (0.35)
State level Unemployment -3.87 (0.92) -3.30 (0.87) -2.83 (0.58) -2.79 (0.59)
Housing starts 1.08 (0.63) 0.77 (0.66) - -
Per capita income growth 0.40 (0.45) 0.48 (0.47) - -
Farm, Agri and Mining 0.78 (0.48) 0.46 (0.52) - -
Previous Closures - -0.24 (0.17) -0.22 (0.12) -
% Assets in Banks with Texas Ratio > 100% - -0.35 (0.20) -0.38 (0.15) -0.40 (0.17)
incorporating the two measures of banking distress are reported in Table 1.6. In order to
evaluate qualitative differences in results across the specifications, I compare the covariate
effects of Interest Rate Receivable Ratio, which is a measure of asset quality and of Size and
report the findings in Figures 1.2 and 1.3. The latent classes resulting from these models are
labeled as “High Regional and Banking Distress (HRBD)” and “Low Regional and Banking
Distress (LRBD)” failures on account of the presence of indicators of banking sector distress
in the class membership model. These results show that a unit standard deviation change in
Interest Rate Receivable Ratio results in nearly identical changes in the probability of each
resolution type conditional on class membership. A unit standard deviation increase in Size
broadly results in changes in the probability of each resolution type that are qualitatively
similar across the four model specifications. Model specifications 3 and 4, which comprise of
State level Unemployment and characteristics pertaining to distress in the banking sector,
result in larger changes in the probability of OBA in the class of HRBD failures and greater
34
Figure 1.2: Covariate effects of Interest Rate Receivable Ratio across the four model speci-
fications for latent classes based on regional and banking sector distress.
reduction in the probability of a Payout in the class of LRBD failures.
The entire distribution of the probability of each resolution category conditional on class
membership is provided in Figure 1.4. This distribution represents the post burn-in draws
of the mean probability,
Mean Prob(Y = j|s)(g) = 1
n
n∑
i=1
P
(g)
ij|s, j = 1, 2, 3, (1.8)
for g = 1, 2, ..., G. Model specifications 3 and 4 result in greater separation across the two
latent classes in the distribution of the probability of OBA and Purchase and Assumptions
relative to specification 1 and 2. The state of the banking industry provides additional
sources of heterogeneity in the FDIC’s decision rules beyond that provided by indicators of
regional economic distress. These results align with the predictions from Shleifer & Vishny
(1992) and Acharya & Yorulmazer (2008), particularly in the greater reliance on public
financial assistance in the form of OBA when the local banking industry has experienced
failures and deterioration in asset quality.
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Figure 1.3: Covariate effects of Size across the four model specifications for latent classes
based on regional and banking sector distress.
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Figure 1.4: Distributions of Average estimated probability of each resolution type conditional
on membership in the High Regional and Banking Distress (HRBD) and Low Regional and
Banking Distress (LRBD) latent classes across the four model specifications.
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1.4.4 Political Economy Factors
A growing branch of the literature has studied the effects of political economy factors on bank
failure resolutions and enforcement actions. Lambert (2018) found that regulators initiated
enforcement actions with a lower probability against lobbying banks. Igan et al. (2012)
found that being a lobbying lender was associated with receiving a higher share of bailout
funds during the Financial Crisis of 2008. Theoretical models of lobbying and regulation
provide a framework for understanding the incentives of lobbying among interest groups and
the resultant impact on the framing of relevant policies. Stigler (1971) developed a theory
of regulatory capture in which regulations are acquired and developed for the benefit of the
industry that they are designed to administer. Becker (1983) considered competition among
opposing political pressure groups and identified an equilibrium in which the provision of
political subsidies to interest groups is countered by the organization of the taxpayers.
I consider factors related to the political economy of bank regulation and resolution as
potential sources of heterogeneity in the FDIC’s decision rule on bank resolution. This model
includes Congressional voting data on bills pertaining to banks and financial intermediation
in the class membership model in addition to the local economic factors considered earlier. I
study the votes of members of Congress in the vote to adopt the Competitive Equality Bank
Act (CEBA) of 1987 in specification 5. While the major provisions of the Act pertained to
resolving the insolvency of the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, the insurer
of S & L institutions, and in closing the “non-bank bank loophole”, additional provisions
directly pertained to the resolution of failed banks and a loan-loss amortization program
for agricultural banks (FDIC, 1997a). The CEBA provided the FDIC with the option to
establish a temporary national bank or a bridge bank for a maximum period of three years.
This option provided an alternative to liquidation when acquirers were not forthcoming for
a failed bank in the period immediately following its failure (Huber, 1988). Representatives
from constituencies in which bank failures and weaknesses in the industry posed a significant
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risk to stability would be expected to vote in favor of the Act. The votes in favor of the
Act potentially also represent the strength of the banking lobby in districts represented by
members of Congress.
The bills considered in specifications 6,7 and 8 are all components of the Financial Institu-
tions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act(FIRREA) of 1989. I considered the vote on
restoring civil penalties as a candidate covariate since votes against the bill are likely to rep-
resent a positive bias in favor of the banking industry, resulting either from lobbying or from
concerns for the banking sector within a constituency. The bills proposing the restoration
of civil penalties for criminal offenses involving financial institutions and those requiring the
disclosure of ratings assigned to banks and thrifts under the Community Reinvestment Act
(CRA) would have elicited positive votes from members of Congress who were in favor of
introducing additional checks on the banking industry.
I consider the percent of representatives from each state who voted in favor of each of the
four bills as a covariate in the class membership model while excluding representatives who
did not vote. Additionally, I include the percentage of Republicans in each state to ascertain
that voting was not determined entirely by party affiliation. These covariates are based
on the study of the political economy of branching restrictions and deposit insurance by
Economides et al. (1996).
The models summarized in Table 1.7 identify latent classes based on regional economic dis-
tress and political support of elected representatives for legislation in favor of the banking
industry in specifications 5 and 6 and in favor of the introduction of additional checks and
balances on the industry in specifications 7 and 8. The consideration of voting behavior
enables us to recognize political action motivated by either bank lobbying or adverse condi-
tions faced by constituents as a potential mechanism that results in alternative decision rules
followed by the FDIC. The results show that the unemployment rate is statistically impor-
tant in determining class membership in all four specifications. The variables denoting votes
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in favor of banking legislation are statistically important in specifications 5, 6 and 8. The
negative signs associated with the coefficient of unemployment and the share of state-level
congressional votes for CEBA and the S & L restructuring bill and the positive sign asso-
ciated with the vote for civil penalties and ratings disclosure imply that banks that failed
in regions of high unemployment or regions in which Congress members favor bank relief
measures belong to latent class 1. Banks belonging to latent class 2 belong to regions that
are less distressed and represented by members of Congress less motivated by bank relief
legislation, relative to latent class 1. As a result latent class 1 will be labeled as the class of
failures under “High Regional Distress and/or Poltical Support (HRDP)” and latent class 2,
as the class of failures under “Low Regional Distress and Poltical Support (LRDP)”.
The covariate effects for Interest Receivable Ratio and Size and the posterior distribution
of the probability of each resolution type conditional on class membership are provided in
Figures A.4, A.5 and A.6 in the Appendix. Specifications 6, 7 and 8 are qualitatively similar
with respect to the covariate effects of Interest Rate Receivable and Size and the posterior
distribution of conditional probabilities of resolution types. Specification 5, which involves
the vote for CEBA results in a larger effect of bank size and results in wider differences in
the probability distribution for Type I and Type II resolutions across the two latent classes.
This specification, however, results in a greater overlap in the probability distributions for
Type III resolution across the two latent classes. Overall, political economy factors are seen
to capture additional dimensions of information beyond that represented by indicators of
regional economic distress.
1.5 Model Comparison
In this section, I provide an empirical motivation for considering latent class models over es-
timating a simple ordinal probit model with additional covariates. I also compare alternative
39
Table 1.7: Posterior estimates for class membership models that consider indicators for
regional economic distress and political support for the banking industry. Posterior standard
deviations are reported in parentheses.
M5 M6 M7 M8
Intercept 3.21 (0.54) 2.06 (0.43) 2.50 (0.50) 2.85 (0.62)
State level Unemployment -2.64 (0.46) -3.53 (0.69) -3.65 (0.73) -3.29 (0.71)
Farm, Agri and Mining 0.73 (0.35) 0.98 (0.57) 0.47 (0.34) 0.61 (0.36)
% vote for CEBA -2.49 (0.95) - - -
% vote for Recommitting S & L restructuring bill - -1.32 (0.43) - -
% vote for restoring civil penalties for criminal
offenses involving financial institutions
- - -0.58 (0.83) -
% vote for requiring reg. agencies to disclose
ratings given to banks and thrifts
- - - 1.35 (0.78)
% Republicans 0.61 (0.46) 0.76 (0.51) 0.06 (0.65) 0.61 (0.62)
specifications of the model based on different combinations of covariates with the benchmark
models described in Section 1.4.
Model comparison in the following analysis is based on the log Marginal Likelihood. The
principle behind the use of this quantity arises from the use of the posterior odds ratio,
described below to compare models i and j.
P (Mi|y)
P (Mj|y) =
P (y|Mi)
P (y|Mj)
P (Mi)
P (Mj)
The first term on the right hand side of the equation above is the Bayes factor and the second
term is the prior odds. The Bayes factor is the ratio of marginal likelihoods of models i and
j and is the decisive factor in determining the evidence in favor of one model against the
other. Therefore, model comparisons involve computing marginal likelihoods and directly
comparing these magnitudes with each other. I have used the methodology outlined in Chib
& Jeliazkov (2001) to compute the marginal likelihood for the latent class models and the
methodology from Chib (1995) to obtain the marginal likelihood for the simple ordinal probit
model.
The results from Table 1.8 demonstrate that the benchmark ordinal model with latent classes,
M1, performs better than the standard ordinal probit and multinomial probit models in
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Table 1.8: Log marginal likelihood for the benchmark model (M1) and the ordinal and
multinomial probit models with covariates from M1
Model LML
Model Spec. 1 (M1) -701.11
Ordinal probit model (one class) (a) -731.88
Ordinal probit model (one class) + class membership covariates from M1 (b) -730.35
Multinomial probit model (one class) (c) -1283.99
Multinomial probit model (one class) + class membership covariates from M1 (d) -796.94
explaining the FDIC’s decision process. Model (a) is an ordinal probit model and Model (c)
is a multinomial probit in which the covariates are obtained from the ordinal model of M1.
In models (b) and (d), model (a) is augmented with covariates from the class membership
models of M1. The results from this model comparison analysis provide further evidence in
favor of the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the resolution of failed banks as well as
the ordering inherent in the FDIC’s resolution decisions.
Table 1.9: Log marginal likelihood for the benchmark model (M1) and models based on
banking industry distress and political economy factors
Model Covariates LML
1 Regional Economic Indicators -701.11
Regional Economic and Banking Industry Distress
2 Regional Economic Indicators, Previous closures +
% Distressed Assets
-697.99
3 Unemployment, Previous closures + % Distressed Assets -697.04
4 Unemployment + % Distressed Assets -698.18
Regional Economic Distress and Political Economy Factors
5 Unemployment, Farm, Agri & Mining + % vote for
CEBA
-696.71
6 Unemployment, Farm, Agri & Mining + % vote for
Recommitting S & L restructuring bill
-697.02
7 Unemployment, Farm, Agri & Mining + % vote for
restoring Civil penalties for criminal offenses involv-
ing Fin. Inst.
-705.12
8 Unemployment, Farm, Agri & Mining + % vote for
requiring reg. agencies to disclose ratings given to
banks and thrifts
-701.64
The results in Table 1.9 provide a coherent framework for comparing models that were studied
in Sections 1.4.3 and 1.4.4. A comparison of the values of log Marginal Likelihood establishes
that indicators of the health of the banking industry as well as voting on bills that involved
measures to resolve the weaknesses in the banking and S & L sector marginally improve
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Table 1.10: Comparison of alternative specifications of the class membership and ordinal
outcome models with benchmark model M1
Model Num. Incl. relative to M1 Excl. relative to M1 LML
Ordinal model
9 Agri. loan ratio - -712.48
10 Cons. loan ratio CI Ratio -707.21
11 Past due loans Non-perf loans -710.33
12 Non-accrual loans Non-perf loans -703.57
Class membership model
13 Composition of sectors - -719.58
14 Metro/ Non-Metro
indicator
- -702.90
15 HHI - -756.47
16 Size - -700.91
17 Size Per capita income growth -701.36
18 - Per capita income growth,
Farm agri mining
-718.73
Benchmark M1 -701.11
upon the model comprising solely of indicators of regional economic distress in explaining
the FDIC’s decision rule.
The results based on the inclusion of additional covariates in the ordinal and class mem-
bership equations are summarized in Table 1.10. Models 9 through 12 retain the same
covariates as M1 in the class membership model and consist of alternative specifications for
the ordinal model conditional on class membership. The consideration of additional loan
categories relative to M1 in specifications 9 and 10 results in a decline in the log marginal
likelihood. Finally, the models that consider the components of the Non performing loans
ratio (Nonperforming loans ratio = Non-accrual ratio + Past due ratio) are rejected in favor
of M1 on account of their lower log marginal likelihood.
Models 13 through 18 of Table 1.10 retain the same covariates as M1 in the ordinal model
conditional on class membership and consist of alternative specifications for the class mem-
bership model. The inclusion of the share of all sectors apart from agriculture in specification
13 or the HHI in specification 15 result in a decline in the marginal likelihood. The inclusion
of a Metro/Non-Metro indicator in Specification 14 also provides estimates that are sup-
ported by the data almost as much as M1. Models 16 and 17, in which bank size is used
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a covariate in the class membership provide log marginal likelihoods that are close to and
marginally lower than that of M1. This result indicates that bank size was potentially con-
sidered as a criterion to distinguish among banks to which two distinct sets of rules would be
applied by the FDIC and lends credence to the “too-big-to-fail” doctrine discussed in Section
1.1.2. The exclusion of per capita income growth and the share of farming, agriculture and
mining in model 18 results in a decline in the marginal likelihood, indicating the relevance
of these county-level indicators in determining the FDIC’s decision on bank resolution.
1.6 Resolution of Savings and Loans Institutions by
FSLIC
The bank failures of the 1980’s occurred in the backdrop of a more severe crisis within
the Savings and Loans industry. Savings and Loans (S & L) or Thrift institutions can be
considered to be banks that are mainly instituted to promote savings and home mortgage
rather than commercial lending (FDIC, 2007). Prior to 1989, the Federal Savings and Loans
Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) insured these institutions and served as a receiver for failed
thrifts. In 1980, the FSLIC insured about 4,000 S & L institutions and 1,295 of these
institutions failed between 1980 and 1994. The FSLIC itself was declared insolvent in 1987
but operated until its dissolution in 1989. The Resolutions Trust Corporation (RTC) was
instituted in place of the FSLIC in 1989 under FIRREA as a temporary agency under the
purview of the FDIC. The failure of the FSLIC and subsequent federal funding required to
finance the resolution of failed thrifts cost the taxpayer $132 billion (FDIC, 1998a).
Since the FDIC and the FSLIC were both insurers faced with the task of resolving failed
depository institutions in their respective industries, it is instructive to analyze the decisions
made by the FSLIC through the same empirical lens used to study the FDIC’s decisions.
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Figure 1.5: Distributions of Average estimated probability of each resolution type conditional
on membership in the High Regional Distress (HRD) and Low Regional and Distress (LRD)
latent classes across banks and S & L institutions.
Model specification 1 is estimated for Savings and Loans institutions using data from 1984-
1989 and the subset of covariates that were available for such institutions. The estimated
probability of each resolution type conditional on class membership for S & L institutions
is compared with the corresponding probabilities for banks in Figure 1.5. The comparison
across probability distributions of the resolution outcomes reveals that the FSLIC relied
on Open Bank Assistance more heavily than the FDIC. Furthermore, the overlap in the
distributions for S & L’s across the two latent classes contrasts with the clear separation
across distributions for banks. These graphs indicate that the FSLIC did not distinguish
across failed thrift institutions by the extent of economic severity in their region of operation
while evaluating the appropriate method of resolution.
Despite the relative uniformity in the FSLIC’s decision rules in resolving thrifts across re-
gions varying by economic performance, the “too-big-to-fail” effect is seen to prevail in the
resolution of failed thrifts in regions that underwent economic distress as it did in the case
of bank resolutions in Figure 1.1. The covariate effects of Thrift Size in Figure 1.6 show that
the FSLIC was more likely to provide Open Bank Assistance to larger thrifts, particularly
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when they belonged to regions with high economic distress. The relaxation of interstate
banking restrictions is associated with a higher probability of receiving Open Bank Assis-
tance for thrifts that failed in regions of economic distress. Interstate branching in the period
considered in this analysis pertains only to the deregulation within the banking industry as
the thrift industry was not subject to interstate branching restrictions (Roster, 1985). The
deregulation of interstate branching for banks entailed increased competition in regional
markets for thrifts operating in these regions. The FSLIC is seen to have provided these
institutions with assistance when they were situated in regions experiencing adverse eco-
nomic conditions. The covariate effect of Interest Rate Receivable Ratio illustrates a point
of deviation between the FSLIC and the FDIC in their assessment of bank asset quality.
While the FDIC’s decisions revealed statistically important covariate effects of this variable
in the High Regional Distress latent class, this covariate is not statistically important in
thrift resolutions in either latent class. The impact of real estate is relatively homogeneous
across the two classes and Loan Loss Reserves Ratio is observed to be statistically important
in the Low Regional Distress class of thrifts.
Figures 1.5 and 1.6 reveal that the FSLIC provided assistance to failed thrifts with higher
average probability than the FDIC did to failed banks. Moreover, the decisions pertaining
to the resolution of failed thrifts was homogeneous across institutions belonging to regions of
high and low economic distress. Finally, institution-level characteristics pertaining to asset
quality and provisions for foreseeable losses were not statistically important in determin-
ing resolution decisions. These aspects of the FSLIC’s decision process run counter to the
conditions of optimal resolution described in Cordella & Yeyati (2003).
Table 1.11: Distribution of thrift failures by resolution types under two alternative catego-
rizations
Thrift Baseline Thrift IDT Adjusted
Type I: OBA 284 284
Type II: P & A 112 38
Type III: PO 16 90
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Figure 1.6: Covariate effects across High Regional Distress (HRD) and Low Regional Distress
(LRD) latent classes.
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1.7 Additional Institutional Factors
1.7.1 Insured Deposit Transfers
Underlying the FDIC’s three categories of bank resolution are certain sub-categories of meth-
ods that share characteristics in common across two broad resolution types. In particular,
Type II resolutions consist of a range of Purchases and Assumptions transactions as well
as Insured Deposit Transfers (IDT). An IDT involves the transfer of insured and secured
deposits, cash and other assets of a failed bank to an agent institution, which in turn pays
customers the amount of their insured deposits or permits them to open a new account in the
agent institution (FDIC, 2007). Since these transactions involve the transfer of assets and
deposits like other Type II resolutions but are primarily intended to result in payouts in the
manner of Type III resolutions, I have estimated the benchmark model, M1 by considering
all IDT resolutions as Type III instead of Type II transactions. Figure 1.7 shows a leftward
shift in the distributions of the average probability of Type II transactions for the two classes
in the adjusted model relative to M1 and an equivalent rightward shift in the probability of
Type III transactions as expected from the nature of the adjustment of outcome categories.
The separation in the distributions of the two classes continues to hold, hence corroborating
the relevance of the indicators of regional distress in identifying two distinct groups of banks
that were subjected to alternative decision rules even under the alternative categorization of
resolutions.
Table 1.12: Distribution of failures by resolution types under two alternative categorizations
Baseline IDT Adjusted
Type I: OBA 118 118
Type II: P & A 1175 1014
Type III: PO 92 253
Figures 1.8 and 1.9 show that the probability of a Payout increases by a greater extent
in response to a unit standard deviation change in Interest Receivable Ratio under the
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Figure 1.7: Distributions of Average estimated probability of each resolution type conditional
on membership in the High Regional Distress (HRD) and Low Regional (LRD) latent classes
across the Baseline model and model with outcome adjusted for IDT transactions.
adjusted model relative to the baseline model. The probability of a Payout decreases by
a greater magnitude in response to a unit standard deviation increase in bank size. These
figures illustrate the preservation of the ordering of outcomes despite the change in their
categorization. If IDT’s had been assigned at random to banks, their reassignment into the
Type III group would have weakened the estimates of coefficients of financial variables and
consequently resulted in smaller covariate effects. This would also have been the case if banks
that received IDT’s had better financial characteristics than the average bank that received
a Type II resolution. The preservation of the statistical importance of the covariate effects
despite the adjustment to the outcome categories shows that IDT transactions represent an
intermediate category that are at the lower end of the distribution of Type II resolutions
and at the high end of Type III resolutions. The log marginal likelihood from this model
is -1028, which is more than 300 points lower on the log scale than that resulting from the
benchmark model. This comparison shows that the data favors the inclusion of IDT’s within
Type II resolutions rather than with Deposit Payout transactions in Type III.
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Figure 1.8: Covariate effects of Interest Rate Receivable Ratio across the Baseline model
and model with outcome adjusted for IDT transactions for latent classes based on regional
distress.
Figure 1.9: Covariate effects of Size across the Baseline model and model with outcome
adjusted for IDT transactions for latent classes based on regional distress.
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1.7.2 Bank Holding Companies
A bank holding company(BHC) is an organization that owns and/or controls one or more
U.S. banks6. The Federal Reserve maintained that bank holding companies were to function
as a source of strength to their banking subsidiaries by providing capital and resources to
safeguard against failure in times of financial distress. FIRREA (1989) introduced cross-
guarantee provisions, thereby permitting the FDIC to recover some of its costs of resolving
bank failures from the capital of the solvent institutions within the bank holding company.
Ashcraft (2008) found that banks within a multi-bank holding company benefited from
the resources of the parent organization, both in terms of experiencing lower probability
of default and higher likelihood of obtaining capital, particularly after the cross-guarantee
provisions passed under FIRREA(1989). Prior to this regulation, the FDIC found that bank
holding companies retained their strong banks while allowing weaker banks to fail, eventually
transferring the costs of failure to the FDIC. M Corp, a bank holding company from Texas
with several insolvent banks among its 25 subsidiaries, won the right to retain its healthy
banks through litigation and passed on a cost of $2 billion from its failed bank subsidiaries to
the FDIC (Seidman, 2000). Since the cross guarantee provision was introduced toward the
end of the analysis sample and to ensure consistency in the unit of analysis in the sample,
results in Section 1.4 are at the individual bank-level. The results in this subsection have
been computed by aggregating entities that were affected by the cross-guarantee provision
to the bank-holding company level. The list of the 11 bank holding companies impacted by
the legislation have been obtained from Bennett & Unal (2015).
Tables 1.12 and 1.13 reveal that IDT’s, like Deposit Payoffs, were primarily applied to banks
that were not part of BHC’s or those that were not under the cross-guarantee program. As a
result, IDT resolutions are similar to a Type III resolution rather than a Type II resolution
6(source: https://www.ffiec.gov/nicpubweb/content/help/institution%20type%20description.
htm)
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when analyzed at the BHC level. Furthermore, the ordinal nature of the three resolution
categories is statistically supported under the categorization that groups IDT’s with Deposit
Payoffs rather than with P & A transactions in the covariate effects reported in Figures 1.10
and 1.11. These covariate effects are obtained by estimating Model Specification 1 on failures
aggregated at the BHC level and the effects are qualitatively similar to those obtained in
Section 1.4 under the specification adjusted for IDT’s.
Table 1.13: Distribution of failures aggregated by Bank Holding Company by resolution
types under two alternative categorizations
BHC Baseline BHC IDT Adjusted
Type I: OBA 61 61
Type II: P & A 1082 919
Type III: PO 92 255
1.8 Prior Sensitivity
The results from model specification 1 have been generated by considering alternative prior
distributions for the coefficients of the ordinal model. The prior distributions for the remain-
ing parameters are diffuse with α ∼ N (0, 3× I) and σ2s ∼ (4.3, 2.8) for s = 1, 2. Table 1.14
summarizes the estimation results for the coefficients of the Interest Receivable Ratio and
Bank Size as they represent asset quality and franchise value, two important dimensions of a
bank’s value. The posterior means are robust to the prior specifications and this result holds
for all of the remaining estimated parameters across model specifications. The reported re-
sults and covariate effects in the previous sections are conclusively driven by the data rather
than by the choice of priors.
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Figure 1.10: Covariate effects of Interest Rate Receivable Ratio aggregated by Bank Holding
Company across the Baseline model and model with outcome adjusted for IDT transactions
for latent classes based on regional distress.
Figure 1.11: Covariate effects of Size aggregated by Bank Holding Company across the
Baseline model and model with outcome adjusted for IDT transactions for latent classes
based on regional distress.
Table 1.14: Prior and posterior means and standard deviations of βIRR and βSize under
alternative prior specifications
Baseline Informative Diffuse
Prior Posterior Prior Posterior Prior Posterior
βIRR,1 0.00 (1.00) 0.092 (0.04) 0.10 (0.80) 0.092 (0.04) 0.00 (3.16) 0.091 (0.038)
βIRR,2 0.00 (1.00) 0.048 (0.02) 0.10 (0.80) 0.047 (0.02) 0.00 (3.16) 0.048 (0.017)
βSize,1 0.00 (1.00) -0.085 (0.04) -0.10 (0.80) -0.084 (0.03) 0.00 (3.16) -0.085 (0.035)
βSize,2 0.00 (1.00) -0.041 (0.02) -0.10 (0.80) -0.041 (0.02) 0.00 (3.16) -0.041 (0.018)
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1.9 Conclusion
This paper has identified two distinct decision rules adopted by the FDIC in resolving failed
banks depending upon the economic climate in their region of operation and established the
FDIC’s alignment with theoretical norms of optimal resolution. Bank failures accompanied
by regional economic distress were provided with financial assistance by the FDIC and con-
sequently offered an opportunity to recover to solvency with higher probability than banks
that failed under normal economic condition. Bank liquidations, which entailed permanent
cessation of banking relationships, were more common in the latter group compared to the
former. The evaluation of the FSLIC’s decisions reveal that the agency departed from theo-
retical norms of optimal resolution and did not distinguish across institutions based on the
extent of economic distress in their region of operation while it also provided assistance to
failed institutions with a higher probability than the FDIC.
This study has developed a novel, efficient Bayesian method to estimate latent class models,
which serve as an important method to address unobserved heterogeneity. Whereas the
outcome of interest discussed in the paper is ordinal, the marginalization scheme introduced
in the collapsed Gibbs Sampler can be utilized to improve the efficiency in the estimation of
all latent class models, irrespective of outcome type. This estimation approach also provides
a flexible framework for model comparison, which validates the use of a latent class model
over a standard ordinal probit model.
Model comparison exercises also reveal that indicators of regional economic performance
retain their informational value even with the incorporation of political economy factors and
indicators of the health of the banking industry in the class membership model.
The comparison between the resolution policies of the FDIC and FSLIC provides guidelines
for regulators in designing appropriate resolution strategies. The FSLIC went bankrupt in
1989 and transferred costs to the tune of $132 billion to the taxpayer, whereas the FDIC
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sustained the banking crisis of the 1980’s and even assumed the responsibility of resolving
failed S & L’s under the auspices of the Resolution Trust Corporation. The contrasting
trajectories of the two regulatory institutions point to the relative merit for a centralized
regulator such as the Single Resolution Board under the European Central Bank in adopting
the FDIC’s strategies to resolve bank failures.
The findings from this study open avenues into potential areas of research, including the
impact of the alternative strategies of the FDIC and FSLIC on risk-taking incentives among
the institutions that they regulated. Did the resolution strategy of FDIC and FSLIC result in
contrary effects on moral hazard incentives of banks and S & L’s respectively? This question
is considered in an upcoming paper. The impact of each of these resolution strategies on
risk-taking among competitors within local markets also remains an open question to be
considered in future research.
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Chapter 2
Risk-shifting, Regulation and
Government Assistance: Evidence
from the Savings and Loans Crisis
2.1 Introduction
A fallout of the Savings and Loans Crisis in the U.S. was the bankruptcy of the deposit
insurer, the Federal Savings and Loans Insurance Corporation (FSLIC) in 1989 and the
institution of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) in its place. The FSLIC performed the
dual role of deposit insurer and resolution agency in the S&L or thrift1 industry, in a manner
analogous to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in the banking industry.
Whereas the FSLIC undertook one of three actions upon the failure of a Savings and Loans
institution (S&L), namely, 1) the provision of financial assistance, 2) the facilitation of
the acquisition of the failed S&L by a healthy institution and 3) the liquidation of the
1S&L institutions are also referred to as thrifts
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failed institution, the RTC discontinued the provision of assistance to failed S&Ls and all
resolutions involved either one of the two latter actions. The Financial Institutions Reform,
Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA) of 1989 introduced capital requirements and
restrictions on the asset composition of S&L institutions and defined a period of increased
regulatory oversight within the industry.
This paper examines the impact of the change in the thrift regulation regime on the composi-
tion of the balance sheets of operational thrifts. The empirical analysis in this paper consists
of two main lines of enquiry. First, I examine whether a change in the policy stance of the
FDIC towards more stringent resolution methods prompted thrifts that were at the most
risk of failure to ameliorate their financial condition in order to avoid failure. The prevalence
of such an effect on thrift behavior would shed light on the moral hazard effects of providing
assistance to failed depository institutions. Secondly, I investigate the differences between
the responses of stock and mutual S&L to the enhanced regulatory regime. This analysis
provides insights into the relevance of the organizational structure of S&L institutions as
an operative mechanism in shifting the incentives of such institutions and in ensuring the
effectiveness of the new regulatory regime.
This paper provides several new insights into the behavior of thrift institutions following
the closure of the FSLIC and the creation of the RTC during the Savings & Loans crisis
by studying the impact of the regulatory changes on every component of the balance sheet.
Previous research on policy changes affecting deposit insurance and bank resolution have
focused on the risk-taking behavior that primarily measured the composition of high-risk
loans in the balance sheets of these institutions.
In order to address the two research questions, this paper develops a Bayesian method
for causal inference by incorporating the difference-in-difference strategy into the potential
outcome framework developed by Rubin (1978). The use of a potential outcomes approach
eliminates the necessity for the assumption of exogeneity of the treatment to the outcome
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at baseline and of the assumption of parallel slopes across the treated and control groups.
Secondly, the treatment status of individual units in this model is unobserved and this
dimension of missing information is addressed with a latent class model, which assigns a
probability of each unit belonging to the two groups. Simulation exercises demonstrate that
the MCMC algorithm developed in this paper recovers the true values of all the estimated
the parameters.
In addressing the first research question concerning the differences in the responses of thrifts
at the most risk of failure and those with a low risk of failure, I make use of the model
with the latent treatment assignment mechanism since the riskiness of thrifts is not directly
observed on the basis of a single variable. Instead, this approach involves using the financial
statement variables that have been demonstrated to be important predictors of the CAMEL
score in Collier et al. (2003) as covariates in the latent treatment assignment model. Previous
theoretical studies (Cordella & Yeyati, 2003) predict two potential responses of thrift risk-
taking to the elimination of government assistance to failed institutions. The dominance
of moral hazard effects of government assistance would result in an increase in risk-taking
in the regime in which such assistance was available and consequently, in a decline in risk-
taking when such assistance was discontinued. Alternatively, franchise value of effects of
such assistance would result in diminished risk-taking while the policy was in place and an
uptake in risk-taking following its discontinuance. The main finding from this analysis is
that thrifts at a high risk of failure prior to the policy change increased the composition
of safe assets such as Securities and Cash and decreased the composition of high-risk loans
such as Commercial and Industrial (C&I) loans and Construction, Land and Development
(CLD) loans. A sub-category of institutions, characterized by a high stock of high-risk loans
in their books prior to the policy change increased their intake of Multifamily Real Estate
Loans, which is also a category of high-risk loans. The Average Treatment Effect (ATE) for
Securities at 5.2% exceeded the ATE for all other types of assets. This reveals the importance
of the moral hazard effect associated with government assistance to failed institutions.
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The assessment of the differential responses of mutual and stock thrifts to the policy change is
motivated by theoretical literature on risk-shifting incentives of equity-holders in the presence
of debt (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; John et al., 1991; Myers, 1977). Equity-holders of stock
thrifts hold leveraged investments with a potential to shift risk to debt-holders whereas
depositor-owners in mutual thrifts bear risks that cannot be shifted. The equity-holders’
claim to the assets of a firm has previously been equated to that of a call option on the
value of the assets, whose value increases with increased volatility in the value of the firm.
Correspondingly, Merton (1977) showed that deposit insurance can be viewed is a put option
on the value of a bank’s assets where the strike price is the promised value of the debt
on its maturity. The value of this put option can be maximized by increasing asset risk
or minimizing the capital to assets ratio and effectively transfer wealth from the insuring
agency to the equity-holders. The empirical strategy in studying the differences in balance
sheet compoisiton of the two types of thrifts involves considering the organizational form
as exogenous to the response to the policy change as considered in Esty (1997). The ATE
for Securities, as with the analysis on high-risk institutions, registered a higher magnitude
than for all the other components of the balance sheet. The increased accumulation of these
safe and liquid assets by stock institutions relative to mutual institutions following the policy
change provides evidence in favor of risk-shifting by equity-holders prior to the policy change.
This conclusion is further supported by the decline in high-risk assets such as Construction
and Development Loans and Multifamily Real Estate Loans among stock institutions relative
to mutual institutions across the two years before and after the the announcement of the
FSLIC’s closure in 1989.
This paper provides a framework to perform inferences on the enhanced regulatory regime
targeting the thrift industry in 1989 by studying risk-taking among stock and mutual thrifts
within a causal model. I consider federally insured thrifts that did not convert across or-
ganizational types over the period 1987-1990 by considering the period 1987-1988 as the
pre-treatment period and the period 1989-1990 as the post-treatment period.
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Prior studies within this research domain did not address the impact of these reforms to
regulation within a policy evaluation context. Esty (1997) find evidence for increased risk-
taking among stock thrifts over the period 1982-1988, when the measures for deregulation
introduced in the legislation from the early and mid-1980’s was operative. Barth et al.
(1995) found similar evidence of greater risk-taking among stock thrifts relative to mutual
thrifts until 1989. Other empirical studies on the relationship between bank regulation
and risk-taking examined the role of the ownership structure of thrift institutions. Knopf
& Teall (1996) examined the impact of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and
Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) between thrift ownership structure and risk-taking.
The author find evidence of augmented levels of risk-taking among insider-controlled thrifts
relative to widely-owned institutions and that such risk-taking was restrained subsequent
to the passage of FIRREA. Cebenoyan et al. (1999) examined risk-taking in stock thrift
institutions over the period 1986-1995 and found support for the moral-hazard hypothesis as
thrifts with low charter values in their sample undertook greater risk during 1986-1988, when
regulations were more permissive than the subsequent period. Saunders et al. (1990) find
evidence of increased risk-taking among stockholder controlled banks relative to manager-
controlled banks during 1979-1982, which was a period of relative deregulation in the banking
industry.
The article is organized as follows: Section 3.2 provides a background to the role of the
FSLIC, the legislation governing the S&L industry in the 1980’s and the nature of the
change in policy effected in 1989. Section 3.3 develops the empirical specification by building
from the potential outcome framework and incorporating the difference-in-difference principle
within it. This section also includes an efficient MCMC sampling algorithm to estimate the
equations jointly. Section 3.4 details the various datasets used in this study, their source
and a set of descriptive statistics. Section 3.5 provides the results of the model, Section 2.6
provides concluding remarks.
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2.2 Background
S&L institutions or thrifts were first established in the 19th century to meet the social goal
of homeownership at a time when banks did not finance residential mortgages (Robinson,
2013).2 While these institutions were originally organized by groups of individuals who
pooled their savings and lent money to members toward the purchase of homes, they evolved
to operate like small banks with a concentration of assets in mortgage loans. Among the
nearly 4,000 thrifts in operation in 1980, 80% of their total assets of $600 billion were held
in mortgage loans (FDIC, 1997b).
The thrift industry was subject to federal regulation that was distinct from that of com-
mercial and mutual savings banks and legislation within the industry was guided by the
overarching objective of fostering home ownership. The Federal Home Loan Bank Act of
1932 established the Federal Home Loan Bank System to provide liquidity and low-cost
financing to thrifts. This system consisted of 12 regional Home Loan Banks and was super-
vised by the three-member Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). The Home Owners’
Loan Act of 1933 authorized the FHLBB to charter and regulate federal thrifts. The FSLIC
was established under the National Housing Act of 1934 to provide federal deposit insurance
for deposits in thrift institutions and serve as the resolution agency for failed thrifts. The
FSLIC was instituted within the FHLBB, effectively placing the chartering and insurance
functions for thrifts within the same agency, unlike in the case of commercial and mutual
savings banks whose insurer, the FDIC was independent of the chartering authorities.
The period from 1980-1982 was marked by the failure of 118 thrift institutions that cost
the FSLIC $3.5 billion to resolve. The high interest rates of the early 1980’s and the re-
sulting interest rate risk arising from the mismatch in the maturity of assets and liabilities
were recognized as the driving force behind the financial fragility of these institutions. The
2The first S&L was established in Pennsylvania in 1831.
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legislative response to the failures of thrifts was to deregulate the thrift industry and pro-
vide forbearance to weak thrifts. These approaches were codified within the Depository
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA) and the Garn-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982. The previous statutory net worth requirement
of 5 percent of insured accounts was replaced by DIDMCA with a range of between 3 to
6 percent of insured accounts. Garn-St Germain further relaxed capital requirements by
granting the authority to the FSLIC to determine a level of capital that would be deemed
satisfactory. The DIDMCA phased out interest rate ceilings on time and savings deposits
over a six year period Kaufman et al. (1981) and increased federal deposit insurance from
$40,000 to $100,000 per account. DIDMCA expanded the authority of federally chartered
thrifts to make acquisition, development, and construction (ADC) loans and Garn-St Ger-
main eliminated the previous statutory limit on loan-to value ratios, effectively permitting
thrifts to provide high-risk loans that financed the full appraised value of a project.
The deregulation and forbearance enshrined in the legislation of the early 1980’s resulted in
a period of rapid asset growth of 56% among thrift institutions over the period 1982-1985.
During this period, the portfolio of thrift assets shifted from traditional mortgage loans
into other riskier loan categories such as ADC loans. The FHLBB followed lax supervisory
and examination practices during this period, including relocating its Ninth District from
Little Rock, Arkansas to Dallas, Texas in 1983, which resulted in a decline in the number
of examinations by a third. State-charted institutions were subject to particularly lenient
supervisory standards in states such as California, Florida and Texas. The FHLBB was
restricted by its policy of waiting until an institution was insolvent under the Regulatory
Accounting Principles (RAP) standard, which was a more lax accounting standard than
the GAAP and this delayed closure of failed thrifts. Furthermore, the agency lacked the
resources to close the 71 institutions that were RAP-insolvent at the end of 1984 and the
number of failed institutions steadily grew to 227 within two years. The FSLIC was declared
insolvent by the U.S. General Accounting Office in 1986 (White, 1990). The Competitive
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Equality Banking Act of 1987 authorized the FSLIC to borrow up to $10.825 billion but
these additional funds proved to be inadequate to resolve failed institutions. This reflected
in insolvent thrifts remaining in operation for longer periods of time so that by 1988, thrifts
that were resolved by the FSLIC had already been insolvent for an average of 42 months.
The FSLIC was faced with 250 insolvent thrifts, with $80.8 billion in assets, under the RAP
standard by the end of 1988.
On February 6, 1989, President George H. W. Bush announced proposals for legislation to
effect reforms in the regulation of the thrift industry in response to the widespread failures
among thrifts and the insolvency of the FSLIC (FDIC, 1998b). The proposal recommended
the abolition of the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB) as the regulator of savings
and loan institutions and its replacement with a single chairman under the Treasury Depart-
ment. The insurer of thrift institutions, the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation
(FSLIC), was to be dissolved and subsequently merged with the FDIC. The FDIC was to
manage separate funds for thrifts and commercial banks. The proposal also called for the
creation of the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC) to close or sell the thrifts declared in-
solvent between January 1, 1989 and August 8, 1992 (the end date was later extended to
September 30, 1993 and subsequently to June 30, 1995).3
These proposals resulted in the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act (FIRREA) of 1989, which was passed on August 9, 1989. The legislation authorized
the creation of the Savings Association Insurance Fund (SAIF), which was placed under the
FDIC’s administration, to insure deposits in savings associations. FIRREA also established
the Office of Thrift Supervision to replace the FHLBB in examining and supervising thrifts
and their holding companies. This legislation also imposed stricter capital requirements that
consisted of (i) A core capital ratio of 3%, (ii) tangible-capital-to-assets ratio of 1.5% and
(iii) minimum risk-based capital requirements that are no less stringent than the standards
3BUSH SAVINGS PLAN CALLS FOR SHARING THE COST BROADLY; Big Sale Of Bonds, New
York Times, 7 February, 1989
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applied to national banks (Laderman, 1990; FDIC, 1997b). Banks that could not meet capital
adequacy requirements were mandated to obtain FDIC approval before accepting brokered
deposits (FDIC, 1997b). The provisions on the asset side of the balance sheet specified that
secured nonresidential real property loans could be held by thrifts up to 400% of their capital.
The statute also restricted S&L’s from holding any junk bonds. The period since 1989 has
been recognized as a period of increased stringency in thrift regulation. In particular, the
FIRREA has been termed in FDIC (1997b) as legislative “reregulation”, which contrasted
with the previous deregulatory legislation of the early and mid-1980’s.
2.3 Model
This model offers two salient extensions to the potential outcome framework of Rubin (1978)
applied in longitudinal settings (Chib & Hamilton, 2000, 2002; Chib & Jacobi, 2007). First,
the standard joint model of treatment assignment and potential outcomes is extended into
a difference-in-difference framework so that the treated and control groups are observed
before and after the assignment of a treatment and not solely in the post-treatment period.
Secondly, the treatment status of individual units in this model is unobserved and this
dimension of missing information is addressed with a latent class model, which assigns a
probability of each unit belonging to the two groups. The assignment of individual units
into treatment categories occurs only once in the first period and is maintained for the rest
of the sample period as considered in Chib & Jacobi (2007) but considers an alternative
specification for the covariance matrix relative to the previous study. This section describes
the ways in which enhancements developed in this model address estimation challenges for
the problem on thrift risk-taking studied in this paper.
The difference-in-difference estimation method in econometric studies (Lester (1946), Camp-
bell et al. (1963), Ashenfelter & Card (1984)) uses the assumption of a parallel trend for
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treated and control units to estimate the level of the counterfactual for the treated group in
the absence of treatment. Whereas the assumption of parallel trends and the absence of a
relationship between the outcome at baseline and assignment of treatment can be restrictive,
this estimation framework permits the consideration of treated and control units that are not
entirely exchangeable since their outcomes evolve at different levels. In the model developed
in this paper, the empirical design of utilizing treatment and control samples evolving at dis-
tinct levels is retained while relaxing the assumptions of a parallel trend and independence
of the baseline outcome and treatment assignment.
Consider n thrifts and T time periods each in the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods
so that the full sample comprises of 2T time periods. In period 1, long-term financial
characteristics FCi of thrifts determine the probability with which they are safe and risky.
Let Ri be the unobserved indicator that determines whether a thrift is risky or safe. In
the following discussion, thrift i are considered to be risky when Ri = 1 and safe when
Ri = 0. This notation serves to exemplify the structure of the model without loss of any
generality. In practice, the classes are labeled as “safe” or “risky” depending on the sign of
coefficients pertaining to covariates indicative of financial strength such as the 5-year capital
ratio and the ratio of non-performing loans to assets. Let R∗i be the latent continuous variable
underlying the discrete indicator Ri so that,
R∗i = FC
′
iα + 1i, 1i ∼ N (0, 1), (2.1)
Ri =

0, R∗i ≤ 0
1, R∗i > 0
.
The primary outcome of interest measures thrift risk-taking and is the change in high risk
loans as a percent of total assets ∆RTit, which is modeled as a function of covariates Xit
that consist of thrift (Bit), state (Stit) and county characteristics (Cit).
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The full sample of outcomes and covariates is divided into pre-treatment (∆RT0it, X0it)
and post-treatment (∆RT1it, X1it) observations for t = 1, 2, ..., T . The pre-treatment period
starts at period 1 and contains observations until period T whereas the post-treatment period
starts at period T+1 and ends in period 2T , thus resulting in T observations in both periods.
Even though both time periods need not be equal in length in the general specification of
this model, the special case of equal periods is considered in order to ensure symmetry in the
informational content of the two periods. The three sets of (observed and latent) outcomes
and covariates are combined into the vector yit and the matrix Xit respectively.
yit =

R∗i
∆RT0it
∆RT1it
 , Xit =

FCi
X0it
X1it
 , i = 1, 2, .., n, t = 1, 2, .., T.
Since class assignment occurs only once in period 1, R∗i and FCi are replaced by vectors of
zeros when t > 1.
The latent class model introduced by Heckman & Singer (1984) and applied across diverse
areas such as Greene & Hensher (2003), Deb & Trivedi (2002) and Carson et al. (1994)
attributes different distributions to the outcome depending on class membership. Accord-
ingly, this structure entails a separate equation for each risk-group in the pre-treatment and
post-treatment periods and the resulting equations are summarized below.
Pre-treatment, safe thrifts: ∆RT0it = X
′
0itβ2 + 2it (2.2)
Post-treatment, safe thrifts: ∆RT1it = X
′
1itβ3 + 3it (2.3)
Pre-treatment, risky thrifts: ∆RT0it = X
′
0itβ4 + 4it (2.4)
Post-treatment, risky thrifts: ∆RT1it = X
′
1itβ5 + 5it (2.5)
A multivariate normal distribution is specified for the errors from the three outcomes in yit.
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The means of the observations under the two latent classes arising from Equations 2.1 - 2.5
are summarized below.
µs,it =

FC ′iα
X ′0itβ2
X ′1itβ3
 , µr,it =

FC ′iα
X ′0itβ4
X ′1itβ5
 .
The covariance matrix in this set-up is unique as the determination of class membership in
period 1 implies that the relationship across the class-membership and outcome variables
exists only in period 1. This eliminates any relationship between the errors pertaining to
the outcomes from the post-treatment period and class-membership indicators and therefore
precludes the scope for the undue inflation of treatment effects due to classes that are deter-
mined based on post-treatment differences. Notably, the incorporation of contemporaneous
covariances between the class assignment model and the outcome in the pre-treatment pe-
riod is one of the factors that distinguish this model from a standard difference-in-difference
model, which assumes independence across these entities. Moreover, this model allows for
covariances across the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods for the two groups. The
covariances of errors across the risky and safe groups are provided below.
Ωs =

1 Ω12 0
Ω12 Ω22 Ω23
0 Ω23 Ω33
 , Ωr =

1 Ω14 0
Ω14 Ω44 Ω45
0 Ω45 Ω55
 .
The covariance terms of errors from equations (1)-(5) can be combined to obtain the matrix
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Ω.
Ω =

1 Ω12 0 Ω14 0
Ω12 Ω22 Ω23 · ·
0 Ω23 Ω33 · ·
Ω14 · · Ω44 Ω45
0 · · Ω45 Ω55

.
The covariance terms across the latent classes are not identified and are replaced with “·”
since a thrift belongs to only one of the two mutually exclusive categories within an MCMC
iteration.
In decomposing the joint distribution of yit, the standard approach in latent class models in-
volves considering the marginal of the latent outcome R∗i and the conditional of the observed
outcomes [∆RT0it ∆RT1it]|R∗i . However, on account of the unique covariance structure of
this model in which Ω12 and Ω14 apply only in period t = 1, the decomposition into the
conditional, R∗i |[∆RT0it ∆RT1it] and the marginal, [∆RT0it ∆RT1it] is more tractable.
Define µR∗s,i|RT , µR∗r,i|RT , ΩR∗s |RT and ΩR∗r |RT as the conditional mean and covariance of R
∗
i
conditional on the other two outcomes within yit under the two latent classes. The outcomes
and covariates pertaining exclusively to the continuous risk-taking outcome specified with a
“·” in the subscript in order to identify marginal distributions.
yit· =
∆RT0it
∆RT1it
 , Xit· =
X0it
X1it
 .
The mean and variance components corresponding to yit· under the two latent classes are,
µs,it· =
X ′0itβ2
X ′1itβ3
 , µr,it· =
X ′0itβ4
X ′1itβ5
 .
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and
Ωs· =
Ω22 Ω23
Ω23 Ω33
 , Ωr· =
Ω44 Ω45
Ω45 Ω55
 .
The likelihood function is then obtained as follows,
f(y|µs, µr,Ωs,Ωr) =
n∏
i=1
[
T∏
t=1
{
P (Ri = 0|µR∗s,i|RT ,ΩR∗s |RT )fN (yit·|µs,it·,Ωs·)+
P (Ri = 1|µR∗r,i|RT ,ΩR∗r |RT )fN (yit·|µr,it·,Ωr·)
}]
.
(2.6)
Independent multivariate normal priors are assigned to the coefficients α and β = {β2, β3, β4, β5}.
The covariance matrices Ωs and Ωr are assigned Inverse Wishart priors, which are indepen-
dent of priors assigned to the coefficients.
f(α,β,Ωs,Ωs) = f(α)f(β)f(Ωs)f(Ωr),
where, f(α) = fN (α|α0, A0) and f(β) = fN (β|β0, B0). The priors on the covariance matrices
are parametrized as f(Ωp) = fIW(Ωp|ν,Q) for p = s, r.
On augmenting the likelihood in 2.6 with the latent continuous variable R∗i , the augmented
posterior for this model can be represented as follows,
f(Θ|y) ∝
n∏
i=1
T∏
t=1
∑
p=s,r
{
1(Si = p)fN (R∗p,i|µR∗p,i|RT ,ΩR∗p|RT )fN (yit·|µp,it·,Ωp·)
}
f(α,β,Ωs,Ωs),
where Si = s when Ri = 0 and Si = r when Ri = 1.
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2.3.1 MCMC Algorithm
The steps in the estimation of the model are summarized as follows:
1. Sample θ = [α,β] from the distribution θ|Ω, y, R∗.
2. Sample Ω from Ω|θ, y, R∗ in one block by partitioning into sub-matrices.
3. Sample R∗i from R
∗
i |θ, R,Ω for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
4. Sample Ri from Ri|θ, y, R∗,Ω for i = 1, 2, ...., n.
The estimation algorithm follows other algorithms (Chib et al. (2009), Vossmeyer (2016))
involving joint modeling of outcomes without generating the counterfactual outcomes y∗it =
[∆RT ∗0it ∆RT
∗
1it]
′ in the estimation of parameters. The counterfactual outcomes will be
subsequently discussed in the computation of treatment effects. The steps of the estimation
algorithm are discussed in detail below.
2.3.2 Sampling coefficients: θ
The coefficients θ = [α,β] are sampled in a single step by stacking the covariates and
outcomes from equations (1)-(5) in a seemingly unrelated regressions setup(Zellner, 1962).
Let n1 and n2 denote the number of thrifts in the safe and risky classes respectively. Xs,it
selects the rows for which Ri = 0 and Xr,it corresponds to rows that satisfy Ri = 1. The
outcomes ys,it· and yr,it· are similarly categorized. Define zit = [R∗i ys,it· yr,it·]
′, the vector of
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latent and observed outcomes. The matrices are constructed as follows,
Xs,it =

FCi 0 0 0 0
0 X0it 0 0 0
0 0 X1it 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0

, zs,it =

R∗i
∆RT0it
∆RT1it
0
0

, i ∈ n1.
Xr,it =

FCi 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 X0it 0
0 0 0 0 X1it

, zr,it =

R∗i
0
0
∆RT0it
∆RT1it

, i ∈ n2.
When t > 1, FCi and R
∗
i are replaced by vectors of zeros. The parameters of the posterior
distribution N (θˆ, Tˆ ) are obtained as follows,
θˆ = Tˆ
(
T−10 θ0 +
∑
i∈n1
T∑
t=1
X′s,itΩ
−1zs,it +
∑
i∈n2
T∑
t=1
X′r,itΩ
−1zr,it
)
,
Tˆ =
(
T−10 +
∑
i∈n1
T∑
t=1
X′s,itΩ
−1Xs,it +
∑
i∈n2
T∑
t=1
X′r,itΩ
−1Xr,it
)−1
.
θ0 and T0 contain the hyperparameters of the components of θ in the same order so that,
θ0 = [α0 β0] and T0 = [A0 B0].
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2.3.3 Sampling the covariance matrix: Ω
The covariance matrix can be sampled by sampling sub-matrices of Ω across several steps
based on algorithms used in Chib et al. (2009), Vossmeyer (2016) and Li (2011). As high-
lighted previously, the covariance terms Ω12 and Ω14 only arise within the first period and
other variance and covariance terms apply to mutually exclusive sub-groups that vary in size
across MCMC iterations. The sampling algorithm addresses these features of the model by
making appropriate enhancements to previous algorithms from the literature.
The subcomponents Ωtt.s = Ωtt−ΩtsΩ−1ss Ωst and Bst = Ω−1ss Ωst will be used in the partitioning
of the matrix. The hyperparameter Q of the Inverse Wishart distribution is of dimension
3 × 3 as the sampling algorithm only requires considering submatrices of dimension 3 at a
time.
The sampling of the components of Ω requires the introduction of the matrices Rp = Q +∑
i
∑
t η
∗
p,itη
∗′
p,it and their associated conditional matrices R
p
tt.l = R
p
tt − Rptl(Rpll)−1Rplt, where,
η∗p,it = yp,it − µp,it for p = s, r.
The steps in the estimation of Ω are outlined below.
Class of safe thrifts:
1. Ω22.1 ∼ IW(ν + n1,Rs22.1)
2. Ω22 ∼ IW(ν + nT1,Rs22), where nT1 = n1 · T .
3. B12 ∼ N ((Rs22)−1Rs21, (Rs22)−1Ω22.1) to obtain Ω12
4. Define Ωs =
 1 Ω12
Ω12 Ω22

5. Ω33.s ∼ IW(ν + nT1,Rs33.s)
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6. Bs3 ∼ N ((Rs22)−1Rs23, (Rs22)−1Ω33.s) to obtain Ω23 and Ω33
Class of risky thrifts:
1. Ω44.1 ∼ IW(ν + n2,Rr22.1)
2. Ω44 ∼ IW(ν + nT2,Rr22) , where nT2 = n2 · T .
3. B14 ∼ N ((Rr22)−1R21, (Rr22)−1Ω44.1) to obtain Ω14
4. Define Ωr =
 1 Ω14
Ω14 Ω44

5. Ω55.r ∼ IW(ν + nT2,Rr33.r)
6. Br5 ∼ N ((Rr22)−1Rr23, (Rr22)−1Ω55.r) to obtain Ω45 and Ω55
2.3.4 Sampling latent variable R∗
The latent continuous outcomes are sampled from the conditional truncated normal dis-
tribution T N (−∞,0)(µR∗s,i|RT ,ΩR∗s |RT ) for Ri = 0 and T N (0,∞)(µR∗r,i|RT ,ΩR∗r |RT ) for Ri = 1.
The parameters of the conditional posterior distribution are derived by conditioning on the
continuous outcomes yit· when t = 1.
2.3.5 Sampling Class Membership indicator R∗i
The class membership indicators Ri for i = 1, 2, ..., n are sampled from a Bernoulli distribu-
tion with probability of success (Ki) where,
Ki =
Φ(µR∗r,i|RT ,ΩR∗r |RT )P2,i
(1− Φ(µR∗s,i|RT ,ΩR∗s |RT ))P1,i + Φ(µR∗r,i|RT ,ΩR∗r |RT )P2,i
,
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of treatment and control samples in the pre-treatment and post-
treatment periods
where,
P2,i = fN2 (yit·|µr,it·,Ωr·)
and
P1,i = fN2 (yit·|µs,it·,Ωs·) .
2.3.6 Simulation Results
Table 1 provides results for a simulation exercise based on n = 10000 and T = 4 and shows
that the estimation algorithm accurately recovers the true values of the parameters. Figure
2.1 shows the distribution of the control and treated groups across the pre-treatment and
post-treatment periods. This figure illustrates that while the treated and control groups
may be centered around distinct baseline means, it is the varying magnitude of change in
the means across the two periods that is of inferential interest.
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Table 2.1: Simulation results based on 10000 post burn-in posterior draws
Post. Mean Post. Std True Values
Class Membership
α1 0.30 0.02 0.30
α2 -0.51 0.02 -0.50
α3 0.60 0.02 0.60
α4 -0.89 0.02 -0.90
Class 1: Pre-treatment
β2,1 2.00 0.00 2
β2,2 5.00 0.00 5
β2,3 2.99 0.02 3
β2,4 1.02 0.03 1
Class 1: Post-treatment
β3,1 2.00 0.00 2
β3,2 5.00 0.00 5
β3,3 3.99 0.02 4
β3,4 2.02 0.03 2
Class 2: Pre-treatment
β4,1 -10.00 0.00 -10
β4,2 -6.00 0.00 -6
β4,3 -2.99 0.02 -3
β4,4 -4.02 0.03 -4
Class 2: Post-treatment
β5,1 -9.99 0.00 -10
β5,2 1.00 0.00 1
β5,3 1.97 0.02 2
β5,4 -3.97 0.03 -4
Covariance matrix
Ω1,2 -0.22 0.02 -0.20
Ω1,4 0.18 0.02 0.20
Ω2,2 0.79 0.01 0.80
Ω2,3 0.10 0.01 0.10
Ω3,3 0.77 0.01 0.75
Ω4,4 0.78 0.01 0.80
Ω4,5 0.09 0.01 0.10
Ω5,5 0.74 0.01 0.75
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2.3.7 Treatment Effects
Treatment effects are computed by extending the method for this computation described in
Chib & Hamilton (2002) in two main directions. First, the treatment effects are extended
into the difference-in-difference framework so that differences are calculated both across the
two latent classes and across the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. Secondly, the
treatment effects are computed so that the static nature of class membership indicators
across time is addressed.
As a first step, average values of observed and counterfactual outcomes are computed for
each thrift i in the sample.
ys,mi =

1
T
∑T
t=1 (∆RTmit) whenRi = 0,
1
T
∑T
t=1 (∆RT
∗
mit) whenRi = 1,
for m = 0, 1.
yr,mi =

1
T
∑T
t=1 (∆RT
∗
mit) whenRi = 0,
1
T
∑T
t=1 (∆RTmit) whenRi = 1,
for m = 0, 1.
The treatment effect for each observation is then computed as follows,
δi = (yr,1i − yr,0i)− (ys,1i − ys,0i) for i = 1, 2, ..., n.
The thrift-level treatment effect is then utilized to compute the average mean treatment
effect by averaging over the G MCMC iterations as follows,
δ¯ =
1
Gn
G∑
g=1
n∑
i=1
δ
(g)
i
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Since the full distribution of δ is obtained from the MCMC runs, summary statistics in
addition to the mean such as percentiles and measures of dispersion can also be directly
obtained. The contribution of each individual observation towards the treatment effect as
part of the safe (control) or risky (treated) groups is implicitly weighted by the probability
of belonging to each of these groups since the class membership indicator Ri changes for
each of the G MCMC iterations. The Average Treatment Effect in the following discussion
refers to the average mean treatment effect δ¯.
2.4 Data
The model in Section 3.3 has been applied on quarterly Thrift Financial Reports obtained
from the FDIC. The outcome of interest is the change in the composition of categories of
assets and liabilities as a ratio of total assets on a year-on-year basis. The covariates are
various ratios of financial condition computed using data from the Thrift Financial Reports
from one year prior to the outcome. The summaries of the data utilized in the analysis are
provided in the tables below.
The sample consists of 1022 thrifts that were retained from the universe of federally insured
thrifts after applying the following exclusions:
1. Thrifts that change across mutual and stock categories during the period 1986Q1-
1990Q4.
2. De novo thrifts.
3. Foreign charters.
4. Acquired and acquiring thrifts.
5. Thrifts that failed prior to 1989.
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The covariates for the latent class model as measured of 1987Q1. The outcomes for the
pre-treatment and post-treatment periods are measured over 1987Q1-1988Q4 and 1989Q1-
1990Q4. The data consists of 8176 thrift-quarters.
Table 2.2: Descriptive statistics of covariates from the latent class treatment assignment
model
Mean Std. dev. Min Max
CI Ratio 5yr 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.26
CLD Ratio 5yr 0.05 0.10 0.00 1.28
Cons Ratio 5yr 0.05 0.05 0.00 0.49
RE Ratio 5yr 0.97 0.09 0.53 2.49
Loan Loss Res Ratio 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.07
Int. Receivable 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
Size (‘000s USD) 98,107 158,114 1,110 2,339,848
Cap Ratio 5yr 0.07 0.03 -0.03 0.25
Sec Ratio 5yr 0.27 0.16 0.00 0.91
Undiv Profit 5yr 0.06 0.04 -0.12 0.25
Vol Liab 5yr 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.58
Cr Concen 0.12 0.13 0.00 1.05
2.5 Results
Figure 2.2: Heat map identifying the direction of effects of each of the covariates in the class
membership model in defining treated and control groups for each balance sheet item
Figure 2.2 provides an overview of the classification achieved from the latent class model
within the model structure developed in Section 3.3 when each of the balance sheet compo-
nents listed on the top row of the table are the outcome of interest. This figure identifies
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Table 2.3: Descriptive statistics of covariates from the treatment model
Pre-treatment Post-treatment
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
CI Ratio 0.01 0.03 -0.55 0.77 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.37
Int. Receivable 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
Size(‘ooos USD) 97,710 157,879 1,061 2,405,318 112,258 195,041 1,129 2,870,261
Cap. Ratio 0.07 0.04 -0.05 0.56 0.07 0.03 -0.10 0.29
Earnings 0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.04 0.00 0.00 -0.06 0.05
Oper. Lev. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03
Age 65.03 29.26 0.00 153.00 67.03 29.26 2.00 155.00
State Econ. Distress 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00
Fed. Charter 0.42 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.43 0.50 0.00 1.00
Table 2.4: Descriptive statistics of outcomes from the treatment model
Pre-treatment Post-treatment
Mean Std. dev. Min Max Mean Std. dev. Min Max
% ∆ C&I Ratio 0.05 1.05 -13.96 25.91 0.01 0.77 -12.71 12.78
% ∆ Multifamily Loan Ratio 0.05 2.12 -20.73 35.29 -0.01 1.55 -30.05 17.47
% ∆ Cons. Land Dev. Ratio -0.06 3.67 -83.33 56.81 -0.20 2.56 -38.90 23.01
% ∆ Core Dep. Ratio -0.56 4.54 -41.10 60.54 0.40 4.10 -67.05 32.34
% ∆ Securities Ratio -0.14 6.57 -75.15 70.68 -4.52 7.63 -64.28 36.10
% ∆ Dep. Over Ins. Ratio 0.05 3.22 -62.18 27.74 0.03 2.54 -23.74 70.97
% ∆ Cash Ratio -0.21 1.67 -43.99 23.76 -0.01 0.98 -10.12 42.14
% ∆ Premises Ratio 0.02 0.39 -4.53 5.22 0.02 0.34 -3.35 5.82
% ∆ Bro. Dep. Ratio 0.08 1.46 -35.52 42.14 -0.05 1.67 -34.93 29.42
% ∆ OREO Ratio 0.04 0.60 -4.93 7.18 0.02 0.64 -6.32 7.90
% ∆ Invst. In RE Ratio 0.00 0.70 -29.35 11.78 -0.02 0.55 -12.31 12.31
% ∆ Invst. In Subs. Ratio 0.00 0.60 -10.67 13.70 0.00 0.74 -22.28 22.68
% ∆ Oth. Assets Ratio -0.04 0.94 -23.67 25.07 -0.01 0.81 -27.84 14.95
Figure 2.3: Box plot of the posterior distribution of Average Treatment Effects for categories
of assets
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Figure 2.4: Box plot of the posterior distribution of Average Treatment Effects for categories
of liabilities
those covariates that were statistically important viz., covariates whose two-standard devi-
ation credibility interval lies solely within the positive or negative region of the real line.
The covariates used in the class membership model are five-year averages of the categories
of financial characteristics used in developing the CAMEL score (Collier et al., 2003). The
use of long-term averages results in classification based on intrinsic financial health rather
than based on movements in the balance sheet at a point in time that might themselves have
been influenced by the policy change. Therefore, these long-term averages serve as instru-
ments while studying subsequent changes in the various components of the balance sheet.
The results show that average size, profit over assets and ratio of volatile liabilities to total
liabilities are statistically important determinants of latent classes of thrifts that respond
heterogeneously to the change in resolution methods and deposit insurance provider.
Figure 2.3 represents the Average Treatment Effect for each of the asset classes. The ATE
for Securities has the largest magnitude relative to the ATE for all the other components of
the balance sheet. The heat map in Figure 2.2 shows that the treated group in the model
for Securities consists of large, profitable thrifts with low levels of loss reserves, capital and
securities ratios as well as a low ratio of volatile liabilities. These results provide evidence
in favor of the moral hazard effects of government guarantees. The policy changes that
engendered a more conservative approach to the insurance and resolution of thrifts resulted
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in high-risk thrifts accumulating additional securities, which are considered to be an asset
class that is both safe and liquid, relative to low-risk thrifts.
The other two categories of assets with a statistically important ATE are Cash and Multi-
family real estate loans. The treated group in the model for Cash are small, weakly-profitable
thrifts with high five-year average ratios of Commerical & Industrial Loans, Construction,
Land and Development Loans and Capital to total assets. Since these institutions accu-
mulated a stock of high-risk loans over time, they responded to the policy change by accu-
mulating additional stock of cash relative to the thrifts with lower ratios of high-risk loans
to total assets. The category of institutions that increase their share of Multifamily Real
Estate Loans or the treated group consists of thrifts with a high ratio of Construction, Land
and Development Loans to total assets and those with low levels of Credit Concentration.
Therefore, this group of institutions consists of thrifts that had previously acquired elevated
levels of a high-risk category of loans but did not carry loans that had large exposures to a
single borrower in their balance sheets.
On the liabilities side of the balance sheet, the ATE for Brokered Deposits, Core Deposits
and Deposits over the Insurance Limit are all statistically important. The heat map reveals
that the treated group with respect to Core Deposits and Brokered Deposits are highly
leveraged banks with a low proportion of volatile liabilities. The treated group for Core
Deposits additionally includes big banks with a high profit ratio. The treated group for
Brokered Deposits is also defined by banks with a high ratio of Securities to total assets
as well as high levels of Credit Concentration. The treated group for Deposits over the
Insurance Limit is composed of small banks with high capital ratios, low profit ratios and
high levels of volatile liabilities, which is the complement of the treated group for Core
Deposits. This analysis reveals that large, highly leveraged banks underwent a decline in the
change of both Core Deposits and Deposits over Insurance Limit to total liabilities relative
to small, well-capitalized banks following the FSLIC’s closure.
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2.5.1 Risk-shifting among Stock Thrifts
Figure 2.5: Box plot of the posterior distribution of Average Treatment Effects for categories
of assets
Figure 2.6: Box plot of the posterior distribution of Average Treatment Effects for categories
of liabilities
In assessing the magnitude of risk-shifting among stock thrift institutions, I apply the model
from Section 3.3 on outcomes defined in Section 3.4 by considering stock thrifts and mutual
thrifts to be the treated and control groups respectively. I consider organizational structure to
be exogenous to the outcome in line with Esty (1997). As a result, Equation 2.1 for treatment
assignment mechanism is excluded from the model and the remaining four equations within
Equations 2.3 - 2.5 that pertain to the outcome in the pre-treatment and post-treatment
periods are estimated.
Figures 2.5 and 2.6 summarize the posterior distributions of the Average Treatment Effects
for the various categories of assets and liabilities in the balance sheets of stock and mu-
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tual thrift institutions. Figure 2.5 shows that on average, stock institutions assumed lower
percentages of the categories of high-risk assets associated with real estate lending such as
Construction and Development Loans and Multifamily Real Estate Loans relative to mu-
tual institutions across the two years before and after the the announcement of the FSLIC’s
closure in 1989. The composition of Investments in Real Estate within the thrift’s own
balance sheet also declined among stock institutions relative to their mutual counterparts
following the policy announcement. While the ATE measuring the difference in change in
the composition of Commercial and Industrial Loans across the two categories of thrifts is
negative, the wide dispersion of the effect implies that the magnitude of response among
stock thrifts within this asset category is not statistically important. The composition of
Other Real Estate Owned or repossessed real estate shows a statistically important relative
increase among stock thrifts. This component of the balance sheet is subject to factors
beyond the decisions made by thrift stockholders and managers as it depends on the perfor-
mance of previously booked loans. The treatment effect pertaining to repossessed real estate
highlights the elevated risk inherent among loans booked by stock thrifts relative to mutual
institutions.
The remaining components within Figure 2.5 reveal that the ATE for Cash, Premises, Invest-
ment in Subsidiaries and the asset category labeled as Other Assets (financial assets, accrued
interest and other repossessed assets) are not statistically important. The differences in the
change in composition of Securities in the balance sheet of stock and mutual institutions is
statistically important, as evidenced by the distribution of the treatment effect for this asset
category. Securities held for investment are considered to be low-risk and liquid assets (Balla
et al., 2015; Cole & White, 2012). The relative increase in the proportion of these assets
among stock institutions is indicative of risk-shifting by equity-holders prior to the policy
change.
Figure 2.6 shows that the ATE for Brokered Deposits, Core Deposits and Time Deposits
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over the standard insurance limit are not statistically important. Since the ratio of deposits
to assets is the converse of the capital-asset ratio, this finding shows that even though stock
thrifts increased the composition of securities and accumulated a lower proportion of high-
risk assets in response to the closure of the FSLIC, the changes in the composition of the
financing structure of the two categories of institutions is not statistically different.
2.5.2 Posterior Estimates for Construction and Land Develop-
ment Loans
Since Construction and Land Development Loans is the category of high-risk loans that
results in the largest mean ATE, the results from this estimation exercise are discussed in
detail in this Section. The change in composition of CLD loans in response to a unit change
Table 2.5: Posterior mean and standard deviation of parameters in the model with change
in Construction and Land Development Loans Ratio as the outcome
Mutual Pre-1989 Mutual Post-1989 Stock Pre-1989 Stock Post-1989
Po. Mean Po. SD Po. Mean Po. SD Po. Mean Po. SD Po. Mean Po. SD
Constant 0.151 0.053 -0.267 0.036 0.061 0.233 -0.109 0.175
Cap. Ratio 0.070 0.041 0.013 0.026 0.566 0.127 -0.233 0.142
CI Ratio 0.088 0.053 -0.041 0.029 0.265 0.087 -0.093 0.073
Int. Rec. -0.094 0.037 -0.084 0.024 -0.220 0.174 -0.085 0.141
log(Size) 0.027 0.037 -0.126 0.024 -0.114 0.151 -0.196 0.112
Earnings 0.034 0.038 0.053 0.028 -0.141 0.123 0.183 0.090
Oper. Lev. 0.124 0.044 -0.051 0.026 -0.065 0.104 -0.205 0.081
Age 0.011 0.045 0.037 0.030 0.718 0.143 0.155 0.106
Econ. Dist. -0.449 0.126 0.207 0.083 0.435 0.383 0.583 0.295
Fed. Charter -0.034 0.069 0.079 0.045 -0.254 0.401 0.270 0.305
Table 2.6: Posterior mean and standard deviation of elements of the covariance matrix
Po. Mean Po. SD
Ω22 6.835 0.120
Ω23 -0.040 0.056
Ω33 2.959 0.052
Ω44 6.835 0.120
Ω45 -3.477 0.699
Ω55 20.537 0.723
in the capital ratio provides evidence of altered incentives among equity-holders of stock
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thrifts across the pre-treatment and post-treatment periods. Previous theoretical literature
finds that since the option value of deposit insurance decreases with the capital-asset ratio
(Keeley & Furlong, 1990; Furlong & Keeley, 1989), banks that are well-capitalized have an
incentive to assume lower levels of asset risk. Jeitschko & Jeung (2005) describe moral hazard
incentives for shareholders to assume higher levels of risk across all levels of capital when
assets are High Risk High Return or those with a Mean Preserving Spread. Prior to the
policy change, stock thrifts registered a statistically important positive relationship between
the capital ratio and a change in the composition of the CLD ratio, which is consistent with
the mechanism involving moral hazard. Subsequent to the announcement of the closure of
the FSLIC, thrifts with a higher capital ratio reduced their composition of CLD loans. This
shift in behavior is consistent with the predictions of the model in the absence of deposit
insurance and with an augmented probability of failure resulting from the discontinuance of
assistance to failed institutions. Mutual thrifts did not respond to changes in the capital ratio
in either period. Since these institutions do not have equity-holders, this finding is consistent
with the conclusions from Jeitschko & Jeung (2005) with regard to the relationship between
the capital ratio and the assumption of risk.
Higher ratios of Commercial and Industrial (CI) loans correspond to greater risk-taking
among both categories of institutions prior to the announcement in 1989. Subsequent to the
announcement of the closure of the FSLIC, both institutions scale back the intake of CLD
loans for a unit percentage increase in CI loan ratio. This variable measures the stock of the
largest category of high-risk loans on the institutions’ balance sheets. These responses are
consistent with the theoretical findings of Kareken & Wallace (1978) and Dothan & Williams
(1980) that banks hold the riskiest possible portfolios when deposit insurance premiums do
not vary with policy risk. The model also explains the reversal of the relationship between the
stock of high-risk loans and the change in composition of CLD loans in the post-treatment
period. The institutions readjusted their portfolios to reflect the new incentive structure
to banks in the potential absence of deposit insurance following the announcement of the
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closure of the FSLIC.
Interest Receivable Ratio provides a measure of the credit risk inherent in the lending insti-
tution and has been found to be predictive of bank failure as well as loss to the regulatory
agency subsequent to failure by Balla et al. (2015) and Bennett & Unal (2014). Since banks
with greater exposure to credit risk are limited in their ability to expand their portfolio of
high-risk loans, this ratio is inversely associated with the expansion of the ratio of CLD loans
in the balance sheet across both types of institutions in both time periods. However, this
relationship is not statistically important for stock institutions in the post-treatment period.
Keeley (1990) identified the inverse relationship between bank franchise value and risk-taking.
Since bank size is a measure of franchise value, this finding is further supported in this paper
in the form of a decline in the composition of CLD loans for a unit change in the logarithm
of bank size across both types of thrift institutions in the post-treatment period. This effect
is statistically important in the post-treatment period and is not so in the pre-treatment
period, further highlighting the shift in thrift incentives to preserve franchise value upon the
failure of deposit insurance.
Following the closure of the FSLIC, both mutual and stock institutions increased their com-
position of CLD loans for a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of earnings
ratios. In the period prior to the policy change, both categories of institutions registered
a relationship between earnings ratio and CLD loans composition that was not statistically
important. The earnings ratio is positively correlated with the capital ratio for both groups
of institutions. The findings suggest that higher earnings provided thrifts with the resources
to undertake high-risk lending on controlling for the franchise value and risk-profile of the
institutions.
Operating leverage is calculated as the ratio of fixed costs to assets following Saunders et al.
(1990). Mandelker & Rhee (1984) found that operating leverage, in a manner analagous to
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financial leverage, magnifies the systemic risk in common stock as measured by the capital
asset pricing model. This paper finds a positive relationship between risk-taking and oper-
ating leverage among mutual thrifts in the pre-treatment period, which is consistent with
an expected positive relationship between financial leverage and risk-taking (Keeley & Fur-
long, 1990; Furlong & Keeley, 1989). In the post-treatment period, both categories of thrifts
respond with a decline in risk-taking for a unit percentage increase in operating leverage.
This behavior is consistent with the findings of Kareken & Wallace (1978) and Dothan &
Williams (1980) in that the period in which deposit insurance and government assistance
were available was characterized by the increase in the high-risk assets among banks with
high operating leverage. Accordingly, the closure of the deposit insurance provider resulted
in the decline in risk-taking among both categories of institutions.
Bank age is positively related to the change in the composition of CLD loans among stock
thrifts in both periods. This relationship is not statistically important for mutual thrifts.
Esty (1997) found a negative relationship between the age of thrift institutions and risk-
taking as younger thrifts had the resources to expand their portfolio of high-risk loans in
the form of larger cash balances in the period 1982-1988. Since the pre-treatment and
post-treatment periods in this study consist of outcomes from 1987-1988 and 1989-1990 re-
spectively, the findings in this paper suggest a shift in the behavior of thrifts in the late 1980’s
that was marked by an expansion of high-risk loans in the portfolio of older institutions.
Thrifts that operated in states with economic distress showed an increase in risk-taking in
all cases except for mutual thrifts in the pre-treatment period. This is consistent with results
in Esty (1997), which shows a positive association between risk-taking and the location of
institutions in states experiencing economic distress.
This paper finds that there is a weak negative relationship between holding a federal charter
and expanding the composition of CLD loans in the pre-treatment period. In the post-
treatment period, this relationship is defined by a statistically unimportant positive associ-
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ation for stock thrifts and a statistically important positive relationship for mutual thrifts.
This finding for mutual thrifts aligns with the results from Esty (1997) that found decreased
risk-taking among state-chartered thrifts contrary to the finding in prior literature on this
relationship. The rationale suggested by the author for this finding is that risk-taking is
strongly determined by organizational form and that studies that do not control for the
same could wrongly attribute this variation to the charter of the institution.
2.6 Conclusion
This paper studies the impact of the change in the regulatory regime for thrift institutions
in 1989 on the changes in the composition of their balance sheets. This paper develops a
Bayesian method for causal inference by extending the potential outcome framework devel-
oped by Rubin (1978) into a difference-in-difference approach. This method is more general
than the standard difference-in-difference technique as it allows for the consideration of mod-
eling situations when treatment assignment is not necessarily exogenous to the outcome at
baseline. Furthermore, this approach does not require the assumption of parallel slopes as
the treatment effect itself is measured as the difference between potential outcomes and not
as the difference in intercepts across the two groups as in the standard case. As demonstrated
in this paper, this method serves as a tool for policy evaluation when traditional methods in
contexts where traditional methods require restrictive assumptions that may not be satisfied
by the data.
This paper provides several new insights into the behavior of thrift institutions following
the closure of the FSLIC and the creation of the RTC during the Savings & Loans crisis
by studying the impact of the regulatory changes on every component of the balance sheet.
Previous research on policy changes affecting deposit insurance and bank resolution have
focused on the risk-taking behavior that primarily measured the composition of high-risk
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loans in the balance sheets of these institutions.
The first estimation exercise in this paper involves the use of a latent-class structure to
identify classes of thrift institutions that are distinct in their responses to the policy change.
The covariates in the latent class model are variables that have been identified as important
determinants of the CAMEL score used by regulators in assessing banks and thrifts. The
main finding from this analysis is that thrifts that were high-risk prior to the policy change
accumulated additional securities relative to low-risk thrifts. Similarly, thrift institutions
with a relatively large stocks of categories of high-risk loans such as C&I loans, Construc-
tion, Land and Development loans accumulated additional stock of cash following the policy
change relative to thrifts with lower stocks of such loans. These two findings confirm the
moral hazard effect of government assistance that results in a movement toward safe assets
among institutions when there is move to a regulatory regime that is more stringent toward
failed thrifts. However, this policy change is also seen to elicit an increase in Multifamily
Real Estate Loans, which is also a high-risk loan category. This response is in line with the
franchise value effect of the change in resolution policy, which results in institutions that are
at a high probability of failure assuming additional risk.
This paper also builds on previous research on the effect of organizational structure on risk-
taking incentives and studies the differential response of stock and mutual thrifts to the
policy announcement. As in the previous analysis, the ATE for Securities registered a higher
magnitude than for all the other components of the balance sheet. The increased accumu-
lation of these safe and liquid assets by stock institutions relative to mutual institutions
following the policy change provides evidence in favor of risk-shifting by equity-holders prior
to the policy change. This finding is additional validated by the decline in high-risk assets
such as Construction and Development Loans and Multifamily Real Estate Loans among
stock institutions relative to mutual institutions across the two years before and after the
the announcement of the FSLIC’s closure in 1989. The composition of Investments in Real
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Estate within the thrift’s own balance sheet also declined among stock institutions relative
to their mutual counterparts following the policy announcement. These findings showed
that the realignment of shareholder incentives is an important channel through which policy
changes concerning deposit insurance and resolution can affect financial institution behavior.
In the light of the passage of the Orderly Liquidation Authority of the Dodd-Frank Act that
signals the unavailability of public assistance to financial institutions in the event of failure,
this paper demonstrates that the internalization of such signals by shareholders will be cru-
cial for the policy to succeed in its intended aim of curbing moral hazard effects associated
with the expectation of assistance.
89
Chapter 3
Identifying Heterogeneity of
Consumer Expectations using
Selection of Random Effects
3.1 Introduction
The increased prominence of expectations in macroeconomic models has motivated stud-
ies of survey data aimed at identifying the nature of agents’ expectations. Fuhrer (1988)
concluded that such data contained information that is associated with forecast errors in
consumer expenditure and is not represented in standard macroeconomic series. An im-
portant branch of macroeconomic literature concerns the heterogeneity in agents’ expecta-
tions and its welfare and policy implications (Branch & McGough, 2018; Massaro, 2013;
Branch & McGough, 2009). This paper examines household-level heterogeneity in the re-
sponses within the Survey of Consumer Expectations by the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York (http://www.newyorkfed.org/microeconomics/sce) by estimating a model to select
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random coefficients in the relationship between the responses of survey participants and
covariates based on their demographic and economic characteristics.
Random coefficient models have been proven to be effective tools in addressing biases and
efficiency losses that arise from unobserved individual heterogeneity in panel data settings
(Swamy, 1970; Hsiao, 1975). These models estimate individual relationships between the
outcome and covariates while also estimating dependencies across repeated observations for
each individual. The flexibility offered by such models in estimating the effect of time-
invariant covariates and their applicability in unbalanced panels extends the scope of their
use to a wider range of settings than standard fixed effects models. Random coefficient
models have been widely applied in settings with limited dependent variables such as with
binary(Revelt & Train, 1998), multinomial (Brownstone et al., 2000) and ordinal (Afonso
et al., 2009; Ferrer-i Carbonell, 2005; Anastasopoulos et al., 2012) outcomes. The selection
of the subset of covariates affected by unit-level heterogeneity in their relationship with the
outcome is critical in ensuring that the specification of random coefficients is parsimonious
and that estimation is not unduly cumbersome. Likelihood-based methods for estimating
such models require the use of approximations as the likelihood is not analytically available
in closed form. Bayesian techniques overcome this issue and provide a coherent framework
to both estimate such models and select the appropriate subgroup of random effects without
necessitating approximations (Kinney & Dunson, 2008).
Chen & Dunson (2003) developed a Bayesian hierarchical approach for selecting random
effects in linear mixed models that involves the factorization of the covariance matrix of the
random effects into two components, one that pertains to the standard deviations and the
other, to the correlation terms. The parameters within the components of the covariance ma-
trix can be expressed as regression coefficients and are assigned normal priors, thus enabling
estimation using a Gibbs sampler that is analogous to a selection algorithm for fixed effects,
the Stochastic Search and Variable Selection (SSVS) developed by George & McCulloch
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(1993). George & McCulloch (1997) identified that the simulation scheme underlying SSVS
could potentially generate reducible, non-convergent Markov chains and that samples would
be repeatedly generated from the same model. The authors note that the use of complete
blocking a` la Geweke (1996) enables their approach to overcome this drawback.
This paper provides a method for the selection of random coefficients in ordinal models by
extending the method of Chen & Dunson (2003) for models with continuous outcomes. The
extension to ordinal models requires the consideration of identification issues related to the
scale of the ordinal model as well as the representation of the model using a latent variable
in a threshold crossing setting. The data augmentation scheme introduced in Albert & Chib
(1993) has been adopted in extending the original algorithm to the ordinal setting. This
paper also identifies errors in the algorithm specified in Chen & Dunson (2003) by deriving
the conditional distributions from first principles. This extension of the algorithm into the
ordinal setting can be utilized in studies across various applied fields with panels of ordered
outcomes such as bond ratings, educational attainment, customer surveys, commuter stops
and regulatory bank ratings.
The application of this algorithm on responses pertaining to credit access and financial posi-
tion from the Survey of Consumer Expectations provides evidence in favor of a random inter-
cept. However, the findings do not support the presence of other random coefficients. This
shows that whereas there is unobserved heterogeneity in the expectation-formation mecha-
nism, such heterogeneity does not manifest in the responses to changes in demographic and
economic characteristics of households. The estimates of fixed coefficients of demographic
and economic characteristics are consistent with the findings in Dominitz & Manski (1996)
based on an earlier round of the same survey.
Section 3.2 describes the data from the SCE. Section 3.3 of this paper describes the model
and its estimation using a Gibbs sampler with data augmentation. Section 3.4 discusses
results and Section 3.5 provides concluding remarks.
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3.2 Data
The model in Section 3.2 has been applied on data from the Survey of Consumer Expectations
conducted by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York for the period January 2017-June 2018.
This data has been combined with monthly state-level unemployment rates from the Bureau
of Labor Statistics. The SCE is a monthly internet-based survey conducted on a rotating
panel to gather expectations about a broad range of macroeconomic and household-level
economic variables. Respondents have a tenure of 12 months and each month, the panel
consists of roughly 300 new respondents and 1100 repeat respondents. New respondents in
the SCE are drawn in a manner that ensures that various demographic targets match those
from the American Community Survey (ACS) (Armantier et al., 2017).
In this paper, I study the responses of household heads to two categories of questions,
viz., the change in financial position of the household and ease of access to credit. Two
variants of questions within these categories have been considered - one that pertains to the
change in these outcomes from the previous to the current year and the other, that concerns
expectations on future changes on these facets.
The following two questions from the survey address the change and expected change in the
financial position of respondents. The description of the ordered responses on the Likert
scale with their corresponding descriptions are provided in Table 3.1.
Outcome 1: Change in financial position
Do you think you (and any family living with you) are financially better or worse off these
days than you were 12 months ago? (Question 1 from SCE)
Outcome 2: Expected Change in financial position
And looking ahead, do you think you (and any family living with you) will be financially
better or worse off 12 months from now than you are these days? (Question 2 from SCE)
93
Table 3.1: Mapping of responses to descriptions for questions on financial position
1 2 3 4 5
Much worse off Somewhat worse off About the same Somewhat better off Much better off
The two questions from the survey that address the change and expected change in the ease
of respondents’ access to credit is described below. The description of the ordered responses
on the Likert scale with their corresponding descriptions are provided in Table 3.2.
Outcome 3: Change in ease of access to credit
Compared to 12 months ago, do you think it is generally harder or easier these days for
people to obtain credit or loans (including credit and retail cards, auto loans, student loans,
and mortgages)? (Question 28 from SCE)
Outcome 4: Expected Change in ease of access to credit
And looking ahead, do you think that 12 months from now it will generally be harder or easier
for people to obtain credit or loans (including credit and retail cards, auto loans, student loans,
and mortgages) than it is these days? (Question 29 from SCE)
Table 3.2: Mapping of responses to descriptions for questions on ease of access to credit
1 2 3 4 5
Much harder Somewhat harder Equally easy/hard Somewhat easier Much easier
The analysis in this section is based on responses from 400 heads of households, each of whom
responded to the survey for 12 consecutive months over the 18 month period from January
2017- June 2018. Table 3.3 summarizes the demographic characteristics, self-assessment of
health and financial risk appetite of survey respondents as well as the state-level unemploy-
ment rate, which have been used as covariates in the estimated model. Table 3.4 provides the
distribution of responses to the four questions that constitute the outcomes of the model in
this study. I combine categories 1 and 2 to form the first ordered group and categories 4 and
5 to form the third ordered group during the estimation. The low number of observations in
the groups at the two ends of the Likert scale underlies this modeling decision.
94
Table 3.3: Descriptive statistics of covariates
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
Black 0.09 0.29 0 1
Asian 0.05 0.21 0 1
White 0.86 0.35 0 1
Edu: High School or Less 0.09 0.28 0 1
Edu: College 0.31 0.46 0 1
Edu: Bachelor 0.35 0.48 0 1
Edu: Graduate 0.25 0.43 0 1
Partner(yes = 1) 0.63 0.48 0 1
Years in Residence 12.43 12.17 0 60
Own 0.76 0.43 0 1
Household Size 2.56 2.44 1 39
Health: Excellent, V Good 0.63 0.48 0 1
Health: Good 0.27 0.44 0 1
Health: Fair or Poor 0.11 0.31 0 1
Fin. Risk: High 0.28 0.45 0 1
Fin. Risk: Med 0.38 0.49 0 1
Fin. Risk: Low 0.34 0.47 0 1
Income: 10k to 30k 0.20 0.40 0 1
Income: 30k to 60k 0.25 0.43 0 1
Income: 60k to 150k 0.43 0.50 0 1
Income: 150k and up 0.11 0.32 0 1
State Unemp. Rate 4.22 0.63 2.6 6.3
Table 3.4: Distribution of outcomes
Value Change in fin.
position
Exp. Change in
fin. position
Change in ease
of cr. access
Exp. Change in
ease of cr. access
1 1.27% 1.23% 3.40% 3.48%
2 14.83% 13.31% 19.48% 22.98%
3 49.63% 45.90% 50.06% 48.88%
4 30.44% 34.25% 24.63% 22.35%
5 3.83% 5.31% 2.44% 2.31%
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3.3 Model
Consider the following mixed ordinal probit model with outcome y and latent outcome z,
yit =

1 if δ0 < zit ≤ δ1
2 if δ1 < zit ≤ δ2
...
J if δJ−1 < zit ≤ δJ
.
On stacking the observations over time for each individual i, the equation for the latent
outcome can be written as,
zi = Xiβ +Wiφi + i i = 1, 2, ..., n, (3.1)
where zi is a T × 1 vector of latent outcomes, Xi and Wi are matrices of order T × k and
T × q respectively. φi is the matrix of random effects and is generated by the distribution
N(0,Ω). The disturbances i are distributed as N(0, σ
2I). The matrix Wi is a subset of Xi
so that q ≤ k.
The method developed by Chen & Dunson (2003) involves a decomposition of the covariance
matrix of the random effects, Ω into the following components,
Ω = ΛΓΓ′Λ, (3.2)
where Λ is a diagonal matrix whose elements are proportional to the standard deviations of
the random effects and Γ is a lower triangular matrix corresponding to correlations of the
random effects with 1 along the diagonal. On applying this decomposition, equation 3.3 can
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be written as,
yi = Xiβ +WiΛΓθi + i i = 1, 2, ..., n,
where θi is a vector of independent standard normal random effects. The cut-points δ0, δ1, ..., δJ
are reparameterized using the scheme provided in Chen & Dey (2000),
ψj = log
(
δj − δj−1
1− δj−1
)
, 2 ≤ j ≤ J − 2,
where cut-points δ0 and δJ are −∞ and ∞ respectively. This reparameterization ensures
that the ordering of the cut-points δ is preserved while draws of the unrestricted parameters
ψ are obtained from the sampling algorithm.
3.3.1 Prior Specification
The fixed effects, β are assigned Normal priors, N (β0, B0) and the error variance σ2, the
Inverse Gamma prior IG(ν/2, d/2). Normal priors N (ψ0,Ψ0) are also chosen for the repa-
rameterized cut-points, ψ.
The following prior distributions specified in Chen & Dunson (2003) are applied to each
element {γ, λ} within the components Γ and Λ of the covariance matrix of the random
effects.
p(γ, λ) = p(γ|λ)p(λ) ∝ N (γ; γ0, G0)1(γ ∈ Rλ)p(λ) (3.3)
where Rλ = {γ : γml = γlm′ = 0 if λl = 0, l = 1, 2, ..., q, m = l + 1, ...., q, m′ = 1, ..., l − 1}.
The interpretation of the subspace Rλ is straightforward. When element l along the diagonal
of Λ is exactly 0, this is indicative of the absence of the random effect corresponding to
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covariate l in the model and that row and column l of Ω, and equivalently, matrix Γ are
also 0. The prior on λl, l = 1, 2, .., q is a zero-inflated normal distribution truncated at 0,
ZI-N+(pl0,ml0, s2l0) and therefore allows for a point mass at 0. This prior specification is
integral to the operationalization of the SSVS algorithm for random effects.
3.3.2 MCMC Algorithm
The conditional conjugacy of the prior distributions specified in Subsection 3.3.1 permits the
estimation of the model using a Gibbs sampler. This algorithm specifies the identification
restriction on cut-points δ1 = 0 and δJ−1 = 1 and estimates the error variance σ2 as a free
parameter. The steps in the estimation of this model are summarized as follows,
1. Sample z, ψ|β, θi, γ, λ, σ2 in one block as follows:
(a) Sample ψ from ψ|β, θi, γ, λ, σ2.
(b) Sample z|β, ψ, θi, γ, λ, σ2 for t = 1, 2, .., T and i = 1, 2, ...n.
2. Sample β from β|z, θ, γ, λ, σ2.
3. Sample σ−2 from σ−2|z, β, θ, γ, λ.
4. Sample θi from θi|λ, γ, σ2, β, yi for i = 1, 2, ...n.
5. Sample γ from γ|λ, θ, σ2, β, y.
6. Sample λl from λl|γ, θ, σ2, β, y for l = 1, 2, ..., q.
The sampling of cut-points and the latent variable z in one block in step 1 follows the sam-
pling scheme in Jeliazkov & Rahman (2012). Step 1.(a) involves a Metropolis-Hastings step
in which a proposed value of ψ is drawn from the proposal density ψ ∼ q(ψ|β, θ, γ, λ, σ2) =
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fT (ψ|m,V, ν). m = arg max f(y|ψ, β, θ, γ, λ, σ2)fN (ψ|ψ0,Ψ0), V is the inverse of the nega-
tive of the hessian of the logarithm of the maximand evaluated at m and ν is the degrees of
freedom. The proposed draw ψ′ is accepted with probability
= min
{
1,
f(y|ψ′, β, θ, γ, λ, σ2)fN (ψ′|ψ0,Ψ0)q(ψ|β, θ, γ, λ, σ2
f(y|ψ, β, θ, γ, λ, σ2)fN (ψ|ψ0,Ψ0)q(ψ′|β, θ, γ, λ, σ2)
}
.
In step 1.(b), the latent variables z are sampled from the truncated normal distribution,
zit|β, θi, γ, λ, σ2 ∼ TN(δyit ,δyit−1)(X ′itβ + W ′itθi, σ2) for t = 1, 2, .., T and i = 1, 2, ...n. Steps
2 - 6 are adopted from the algorithm for the Gibbs sampler developed in Chen & Dunson
(2003).
I have noted errors in steps 4 and 6 of the Gibbs sampler proposed by the authors. The
corrections to these steps are provided below:
1. Sample θi from θi|λ, γ, σ2, β, yi from N (θˆi, Tˆi), where Tˆi = (σ−2
T∑
t=1
vitv
′
it + I)
−1 and
θˆi = σ
−2Tˆi
T∑
t=1
vit(yit−X ′itβ), vit = z′itΛΓ. The original algorithm defines vit as z′itΛΓθi.
2. In sampling λl|γ, σ2, β, y from the conditional posterior, ZI-N+(pˆl, λˆl, σˆ2l), the expres-
sion for pˆl is correctly specified in Kinney & Dunson (2008) as,
pˆl =
pl0
pl0 + (1− pl0)b,
b =
fN(0;ml0, s
2
l0)
fN(0; λˆl, σˆ2l)
(
1− Φ(−λˆ/σˆl)
1− Φ(−ml0/sl0)
)
.
The original algorithm contains several extraneous terms in the expression for pˆl.
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Table 3.5: Posterior estimates of parameters of a mixed ordinal probit model from the
simulation study
Parameter True Value Post. Mean Post. Std. dev Inefficiency factor
β1 0.2 0.20 0.05 19.86
β2 0.2 0.25 0.05 19.07
β3 0.2 0.23 0.05 16.28
β4 0.2 0.18 0.02 3.94
σ−2 1 0.99 0.07 23.07
ω11 1 1.06 0.12 34.31
ω22 0.8 0.86 0.11 17.93
ω33 1 0.99 0.12 22.56
ω44 0 0.00 0.00 15.72
ω12 0.6 0.57 0.09 18.72
ω13 0.4 0.40 0.10 15.52
ω14 0 0.00 0.01 5.58
ω23 0.2 0.19 0.09 9.22
ω24 0 0.00 0.01 15.29
ω34 0 0.00 0.01 5.98
3.3.3 Simulation Study
The MCMC algorithm in Subsection 3.3.2 was implemented on simulated data where n =
500, T = 8. I have considered four covariates including the intercept, of which random effects
are introduced for X1, X2 and X3. In this exercise, all the covariates in X are candidates
for random effects so that W ≡ X. The continuous covariates have been generated from a
N (0, 1.44) distribution and subsequently standardized and to a mean of 0 and unit standard
deviation. The outcome in the simulated data consists of 3 categories with 43%, 26% and
31% of observations in categories 1,2 and 3 respectively. The MCMC algorithm does not
require a step for estimating the cut-points owing to the identification restrictions in which
δ1 = 0 and δ2 = 1. The results reported in this section are based on 5000 post burn-in
simulations with a burn-in of 500. The simulation exercise aims to assess the algorithm
on two main criteria - estimation and selection. On the dimension of estimation, the true
values of all parameters are contained within a one-standard deviation credibility interval.
The inefficiency factors are high for the components of the covariance matrix that pertain
to covariates with which a random effect is associated. The complete blocking algorithm of
Geweke (1996) in which each component of the Λ is sampled one at a time overcomes the
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reducibility inherent in the SSVS algorithm of George & McCulloch (1993) but results in
high correlations across successive draws. The algorithm correctly estimates a zero variance
term ω44 and hence attributes no random effect to the covariate X4, which is consistent with
the specification in the data generating process. The posterior probability of inclusion of
random effects are 1,1,1 and 0.044 respectively for X1, X2, X3 and X4. Table 3.5 and the
following figures of posterior distributions both validate the effectiveness of the algorithm in
its selection and estimation capabilities.
3.4 Results
Tables 3.6 - 3.9 summarize the five models with the highest posterior probability for each of
the four outcomes of interest based on 5000 MCMC iterations after allowing for a burn-in of
500 iterations. In all four cases, the model associated with the highest posterior probability,
and consequently the selected model, only includes a random intercept and no other random
coefficients. These results provide evidence in favor of unobserved heterogeneity among
households’ perceptions and expectations of current and future financial position and credit
access respectively. There is limited evidence in favor of heterogeneity in the relationships
between survey responses and demographic and economic characteristics of households.
The posterior moments of the fixed coefficients from the sample draws pertaining to the
selected model are reported in Table 3.10. These results highlight the importance of race in
determining both the current financial position and access to credit as well as expectations
of the evolution of these outcomes. Since the reported values are coefficients from an ordered
outcome model, the negative and positive signs are only informative of the increase in the
probability of occurrence of the first and last categories of the outcome respectively for a
unit change in the value of the covariates. Black heads of households are more likely to
report greater financial precariousness and difficulty in access to credit relative to household
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Figure 3.1: Posterior densities of β1, β2, β3 and β4
Figure 3.2: Posterior density of σ−2
Figure 3.3: Posterior densities of ω11, ω22, ω33 and ω44
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Table 3.6: Models with the highest posterior probability for Change in financial position
Selected Random Effects Posterior Probability
Constant 0.61
State Unemp., Own, Constant 0.05
Edu: College, Black, Constant 0.04
Years in Res., Asian, Constant 0.03
Health: Good, Household Size, Constant 0.03
Table 3.7: Models with the highest posterior probability for Expected change in financial
position
Selected Random Effects Posterior Probability
Constant 0.61
Black, Constant 0.09
Edu: College, Constant 0.03
Household Size, Own, Constant 0.02
Inc.: 10k-30k, Fin. Risk: High, Constant 0.02
Table 3.8: Models with the highest posterior probability for Change in ease of credit access
Selected Random Effects Posterior Probability
Constant 0.67
Health: Good, Asian, Constant 0.05
Black, Constant 0.03
Edu: High School or Less, Constant 0.02
Partner, Constant 0.02
Table 3.9: Models with the highest posterior probability for Expected change in ease of
credit access
Selected Random Effects Posterior Probability
Constant 0.67
Inc.: 10k-30k, Constant 0.05
Inc.: 30k-60k, Constant 0.02
Household Size, Constant 0.02
Health: Good, Constant 0.02
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Table 3.10: Posterior Mean and Standard Deviation of the coefficients
Change in fin.
position
Exp. Change in
fin. position
Change in ease
of cr. access
Exp. Change in
ease of cr. access
Constant 0.72(0.03) 0.82(0.04) 0.54(0.04) 0.47(0.03)
Black -0.02(0.03) 0.09(0.03) -0.08(0.04) -0.08(0.04)
Asian -0.05(0.03) -0.09(0.03) 0.00(0.03) 0.02(0.03)
Edu. ≤HS 0.01(0.04) 0.00(0.04) -0.07(0.03) -0.04(0.04)
College -0.03(0.03) 0.02(0.04) -0.05(0.04) -0.02(0.03)
Partner -0.01(0.04) 0.00(0.04) 0.02(0.04) 0.00(0.04)
Years in Res. -0.03(0.04) -0.07(0.04) 0.08(0.03) 0.07(0.04)
Own 0.03(0.03) -0.02(0.04) 0.10(0.04) 0.11(0.03)
Household Size 0.04(0.03) 0.04(0.04) 0.00(0.04) 0.02(0.04)
Health: Excell. 0.19(0.05) 0.18(0.06) 0.10(0.06) 0.10(0.06)
Health: Good 0.03(0.05) 0.04(0.05) 0.05(0.06) 0.08(0.06)
Fin. Risk: High 0.12(0.03) 0.06(0.03) 0.08(0.03) 0.06(0.03)
Inc.: 10k-30k -0.04(0.04) -0.01(0.05) 0.01(0.04) -0.01(0.04)
Inc.: 30k-60k -0.08(0.04) -0.07(0.04) -0.04(0.04) -0.05(0.04)
State Unemp. 0.01(0.02) 0.02(0.02) -0.02(0.02) -0.01(0.03)
heads of other races. This aligns with the findings of perceptions of greater economic inse-
curity among black respondents to the SCE identified by Dominitz & Manski (1996). The
increased ease of access to credit among home-owners and respondents who have resided in
their current address for a longer duration is consistent with the salience of these character-
istics in determining creditworthiness in lenders’ decisions to provide credit (Mays, 2001).
Respondents who report being in very good or excellent health are also more likely to report
experiencing more a favorable current and expected financial position. Whereas the potential
for endogeneity due to simultaneity in the relationship between health and current financial
position is high (Schwandt, 2018), such simultaneity is weakened when the outcome is the
expected financial position. Respondents who report a greater appetite for financial risk
also report being situated in a better financial position as well as experiencing easier current
and expected access to credit. This finding is insightful and points to potential areas of
investigation concerning attitudes toward risk and financial outcomes using household-level
data.
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3.5 Conclusion
This paper uses a statistical method for the selection of random effects to draw insights into
the nature of household perceptions and expectations of current and future financial access
and position respectively. This study extends the algorithm by Chen & Dunson (2003) to
a model with ordered categorical outcomes and illustrates its use as a diagnostic tool to
select random effects and consequently, identify unit-level heterogeneity in relationships be-
tween outcome and covariates. The application of this algorithm on data from the Survey of
Consumer Expectations results in the selection of a model with a random intercept, thus in-
dicating the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the expectation-formation mechanism of
households. However, the findings do not support the presence of other random coefficients.
This shows that the relationship between the survey responses pertaining to credit access and
financial position and covariates based on demographic and economic characteristics do not
vary by household. The estimates of fixed coefficients of demographic and economic charac-
teristics are consistent with relationships established in previous studies based on analogous
surveys. The method underlying this analysis can be extended to a wider class of problems,
notably, in identifying the presence of time varying parameters in macroeconomic models.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
A.1 Types of Open Bank Assistance
• Loans, contributions, deposits, asset purchases, or the assumption of liabilities.
• A cash contribution to restore capital to a positive level.
• An FDIC note or loan to cover the deficit was common in larger OBA transactions.
• Losses were covered for a specified amount on a pool of assets over a specified period
of time in certain cases.
• Required new management, sought the dilution of ownership interest to a nominal
amount, and called for a private sector infusion of capital.
• OBA also used by the FDIC to facilitate the acquisition of a failing bank or thrift by
a healthy institution.
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A.2 Full Gibbs Sampler
Algorithm: Full Gibbs Sampler
1. Sample βs from the distribution βs|z, S, σ2s for s = 1, 2.
2. Sample σ2s from σ
2
s |βs, z, S for s = 1, 2.
3. (a) Sample α from α|s, β, σ2, y.
(b) Sample li|α, s, where for i = 1, 2, ...., n.
4. Sample s′i from s
′
i|α, β, σ2, y for i = 1, 2, ...., n.
5. Sample zi,si from zi,si |β, σ2, y, S for i = 1, 2, ...., n.
Steps 1, 2, 4 and 5 are identical to the algorithm described in Section 1.2.3. Step 3 of this
algorithm is described below.
Sampling coefficients of the Class Membership Model: α
(a) The coefficients of the class membership model α are sampled from the full conditional
N (αˆ, Aˆ) where Aˆ = (A0 +W ′W )−1 and αˆ = Aˆ(A−10 α0 +W ′l).
(b) The latent variable l is sampled using the data augmentation approach in Albert & Chib
(1993) and drawing from the full conditional distribution, T N Bi(W ′iα, 1), where
Bi =

(0,∞), if si = 2
(−∞, 0] if si = 1
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Figure A.1: Autocorrelation in the posterior sample of α from a full Gibbs sampler in a
simulation exercise based on a sample of 1200 observations.
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Figure A.2: Autocorrelation in the posterior sample of α from the collapsed Gibbs sampler
in a simulation exercise based on a sample of 1200 observations. (α1 is the intercept and
α2 is the coefficient of the unique continuous covariate within the class membership model
considered in the simulation exercise)
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A.3 Estimation of Model with cut-points
The following algorithm is based on the identification scheme used previously, viz., γ1,s = 0
and γJ−1,s = 1 for s = 1, 2. In order to ensure that the ordering of the cut-points is preserved
without having to resort to the introduction of computationally intensive constraints into
the estimation procedure, the following transformation proposed in Chen & Dey (2000) is
used.
δj,s = ln
(γj,s − γj−1,s)
(1− γj−1,s) , 2 ≤ j ≤ J − 2, s = 1, 2
This algorithm uses an MH step to sample δ and β in one block along the lines of the
examples provided in Chib & Jeliazkov (2001). A normal prior is assigned to δs, denoted by
fN (δ|δ0,s, D0,s) for s = 1, 2.
A.3.1 MCMC Algorithm
Algorithm: Collapsed Gibbs Sampler for Model with cut-points
1. Sample βs and δs jointly from (βs, δs)|y, s, σ for s = 1, 2.
2. Sample σ2s from σ
2
s |βs, z, S for s = 1, 2.
3. Sample α from α|β, σ2, y for where σ2 = {σ21, σ22} and β = {β1, β2}.
4. Sample s′i from s
′
i|α, β, σ2, y for i = 1, 2, ...., n.
5. Sample zi,si from zi,si |β, σ2, y, S for i = 1, 2, ...., n.
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Steps 2–5 are identical to the algorithm described in Section 1.2.3. Step 1 of this algorithm
is described below.
Sampling coefficients and cut-points of the Ordinal Model: β and δ
Sample (βs, δs)|y, s, σ by drawing (β†s , δ†s) ∼ q(βs, δs|y, s, σ2), with q(βs, δs|y, s, σ) is the pro-
posal density fT (βs, δs|m,V, ν). m = arg max f(y|β, δ, σ2, s)fN (βs|β0,s, B0,s)fN (δs|δ0,s, D0,s),
V is the inverse of the negative of the hessian of the logarithm of the maximand evaluated
at m and ν is the degrees of freedom. The proposed draw θ†s = (β
†
s , δ
†
s) is accepted with
probability ΥMH(θs, θ
†
s),
= min
{
1,
f(y|β†, δ†, σ2, y)fN (β†s |β0,s, B0,s)fN (δ†|δ0,s, D0,s)q(βs, δs|y, s, σ2)
f(y|β, δ, σ2, y)fN (βs|β0,s, B0,s)fN (δ|δ0,s, D0,s)q(β†s , δ†s|y, s, σ2)
}
.
A.3.2 Simulation Results
The algorithm in Subsection A.3.1 was applied on samples of 5000 observations based on
Parameter specifications 1 and 2 (where γ2,1 = 0.5, γ2,2 = 0.7). Standard normal priors were
used for δs. Y takes one of 4 possible ordinal values in these simulations, leaving γ2,s and
consequently δ2,s to be the only cut-point to be estimated under the considered identification
scheme. The results of the estimation based on the two parameter schemes are provided in
Table A.1
The results show that all the parameters lie within the two-standard deviation credibility
interval. The introduction of the cut-point resulted in a marginal loss of estimation precision
relative to the algorithm in 1.2.3, where true values were contained within the one-standard
deviation credibility interval.
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Table A.1: Simulation results for model with cut-points
Parameter Spec. 1 Parameter Spec. 2
Po. Mean Po. Std. dev. True Values Po. Mean Po. Std. dev. True Values
Class membership
α1 -0.38 0.05 -0.40 -0.33 0.07 -0.30
α2 1.65 0.08 1.50 1.36 0.09 1.20
Latent class 1
β11 -0.41 0.05 -0.40 0.62 0.03 0.60
β21 -0.92 0.07 -0.80 -0.47 0.03 -0.50
β31 -0.45 0.06 -0.40 -0.39 0.03 -0.40
β41 0.57 0.10 0.60 0.55 0.05 0.60
σ21 0.32 0.04 0.25 0.28 0.01 0.25
γ2,1 0.56 0.03 0.50 0.53 0.01 0.50
Latent class 2
β12 -0.26 0.04 -0.20 -0.23 0.04 -0.20
β22 0.78 0.03 0.80 0.97 0.04 1.00
β32 -0.29 0.03 -0.30 0.14 0.03 0.10
β42 0.93 0.06 0.90 0.95 0.07 0.90
σ22 0.28 0.02 0.25 0.25 0.02 0.25
γ2,2 0.69 0.01 0.70 0.66 0.02 0.70
A.4 Comparison Across Model Specifications
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Figure A.3: Covariate effects across High Regional Distress (HRD) and Low Regional Distress
(LRD) latent classes.
Figure A.4: Covariate effects of Interest Rate Receivable Ratio across the four model speci-
fications for latent classes based on regional distress and political support.
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Figure A.5: Covariate effects of Size across the four model specifications for latent classes
based on regional distress and political support.
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Figure A.6: Distributions of Average estimated probability of each resolution type condi-
tional on membership in the High Regional Distress and/or Poltical Support (HRDP) and
Low Regional Distress and Political Support (LRDP) latent classes across the four model
specifications.
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